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FRAUD ON THE MARKET: A CRITICISM OF 
DISPENSING WITH RELIANCE 
REQUIREMENTS IN CERTAIN OPEN 
MARKET TRANSACTIONS 
The still-developing fraud on the market theory is the primary 
method by which securities fraudplaint#s have attempted either to re- 
lax or eliminate the troubling reliance and causation requirements. 
Professor Black examines this emerging theory and suggests that the 
tradifioal common-law fraud concepts that focus on reliance and cau- 
sation still have validiy and continue, even in this context, to ofer ap- 
propriate limitations on liabiliv. The Arficle analyzes cases thaf have 
reducedor ignored this r e h c e  element and explains why the legal con- 
cepts from which the fraud on the market theory evolved demand 
stricter adherence to reliance in certain markets but not in others. Pro- 
fessor Black inco'porates the eflcient market theory into her anaQsis 
by suggesting it as a condiion which the courts should consider when 
determining the degree to which they wi/l demandproof of causation 
and reiiance in a securities fraud case. 
In securities fraud litigation under rule lob-5,' it has become popular to 
invoke a theory of "fraud on the market" in order to relax, or even eliminate, 
the traditional tort law element of reliance. This is accomplished by empha- 
siziig the other traditional elements of materiality and causatioa2 The para- 
t Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1970, Barnard College; J.D. 1973, 
Columbia. The author gratefully acknowledges the research and editorial assistance of Laura D. 
Barbieri, Class of 1984, Pace University School of Law. 
1. Rule lob-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in I942 
under $ lo@) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. $ 78j@) (1982). 
provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
17 C.F.R. $ 240.10b-5 (1983). Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 
(E.D. Pa. 1946), federal courts have consistently implied a private cause of action under rule lob- 
5. The Supreme Court first acknowledged the existence of a private claim in Superintendent of 
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
2. The traditional elements of deceit at common law, from which a rule lob-5 claim is 
derived, are as follows: (1) Misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) reliance, (3) causation, and (4) 
scienter. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $$525-530 (1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS $ 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). Seegenerally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULA- 
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digm of a fraud on the market litigation is a class action brought by purchasers 
- - - - 
noN 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961) (discussion relating the common law deceit elements to the "fraud" 
concepts in securities regulation). 
Materiafiv. A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that the reasonable investor 
would consider it important in making an investment decision. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Although TSC articulated the standard for materiality in cases 
brou t under rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R 8 240.14a-9 (1983), courts have uni- 
fo d y applied this standard in rule lob-5 cases. Eg., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47.49 (1st 
Cir. 1983); Simpson v Southeastern Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1983); Harmsen V. 
Smith, 693 F.2d 932,946 n.11 (9th Cir. 1982); Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703,709 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168,176 (8th Cir. 1982); Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 
156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980). 
Reliance. Reliance involves subjectively determining whether a particular investor consid- 
ered the misrepresentation a substantial factor in making his investment decision. List v. Fashion 
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 81 1 (1965). In cases involving omis- 
sions, the test is met if the investor would have been influenced to act differently than he did had 
defendant disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. Id. at 463. Courts have required that the reliance 
be reasonable in afErmative misrepresentation cases, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687,695 
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977), or that the investor exercise "due diligence" in 
making his decision, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
911 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White contended that the Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari to clarify the standard of care with regard to "due diligence."). 
Causation. Causation involves a determination that the harm suffered by the investor 
"flowed" from the misstatement. See Schlick v. Pem-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374,380-81 
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). Traditionally, causation requires a finding that 
the misrepresented fact was a proximate cause of the investor's loss; thus, the misrepresentation 
must touch upon the reasons for the stock's decline in value. "Absent the requirement of causa- 
tion, Rule lob-5 would become an insurance plan for the cost of every security purchased in 
reliance upon a material misstatement or omission." Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 
F.2d 534,549 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, mod'ed on other ground, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 198 l), 
ofdinpar(, rev'dinpart on othergroundr, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). The Second Circuit, on the other 
hand, takes a more relaxed view of proximate cause, permitting recovery upon a showing that the 
economic loss was a foreseeable consequence of the misrepresentation and not necessarily upon a 
showing that the loss resulted from the misrepresentation's effect on the true value of the security. 
Eg, Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708-10 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 
1011 (1980). 
Many courts use the terms "transaction causation" and "loss causation" instead of reliance 
and causation respectively. Eg., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d 
Cu. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). This author agrees with Judge Frankel, in Schlick, 
507 F.2d at 384 (Frankel, J., concurring), that the use of these terms does not aid analysis in this 
area and instead contributes to the confusion between these terms and the requisite elements of 
reliance and causation in rule lob-5 cases. Therefore, this Article's analysis of causation deliber- 
ately avoids these terms. For a contrary view, see Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule 
106-5, 9 SEC. REG. LJ. 99,100 (1981) (advocating the use of these terms in analysis of rule lob-5 
claims). 
Scienter. Scienter is a required element in a rule lob-5 action. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Circuit courts have included reckless conduct within the definition of 
scienter. See, eg., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. 
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Senvold, 576 F.2d 1332, 
1336-38 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & 
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v. 
Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. 
Sun Chem Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). The 
Supreme Court has expressly left this issue open, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 103 S. Ct. 
683, 685 n.4 (1983). 
Priviv. While at common law there is no absolute re uirement of privity, and thus third 
parties may be liable in a deceit action, plaintiff must neve 4.1 eless be "one to whom, or to influ- 
ence whom, the third party made the misrepresentation." 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1628; see also 
Prosser, Mbreprem%ation and n i r d  Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1966). The insider trading 
cases, in which plaintiffs complain of injury because they were trading in the marketplace during a 
time when others were trading on the basis of undisclosed information, provide most of the judi- 
cial examination of the privity requirement under rule lob-5. Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
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of stock alleging that over a period of time the stock prices were artificially 
inflated due to material misstatements contained in publicly available corpo- 
rate  document^.^ The recent rash of corporate scandals involving allegations 
of "cooked books" and other efforts by corporate management to improve the 
W s  apparent profitability" certainly will give rise to many more fraud on the 
market suits. 
The fraud on the market theory has not fully developed, and few deci- 
sions have extensively analyzed it.5 Its development is traceable principally to 
two factors. First, courts have sought to streamline securities fraud litigation 
to make it an appropriate vehicle for class actiom6 Thus, individual issues of 
proof, such as reliance, which would make an action inappropriate for class 
action certification, are minimized. Second, in recent years there has been in- 
creased judicial, administrative, and scholarly recognition of the "efficient 
market" thesis: which states that in free and actively traded markets, stock 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,239 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[Plrivity between plaintiffs and 
defendants is not a requisite element of a Rule lob-5 cause of action for damages.") with Fridrich 
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976) (because defendants' trading in no way influ- 
enced plaintiffs' trading decision, "defendants' act of trading with third persons was not causally 
connected with any claimed loss by plaintiffs, who traded on the impersonal market. . . ."), cerf. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). 
3. Eg., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cerf. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976), 
discussed infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text. 
4. In recent months, the SEC frequently has expressed its concern over the practice of 
"cooked books," that is, management inflating sales and earnings figures in order to satisfy their 
superiors' desire for increased profitability. Eg., Treadway says Pressure to meet Goals may came 
Executives to 'Cook Books,' SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 421 (Mar. 4, 1983); SEC v. McCormick & 
Co., Inc., SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 21 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1982) (defendants consented to a 
permanent injunction without admitting or denying SEC's allegations); Wall St. J., July 5,1983, at 
1, col. 6 (Nucorp Energy executive accused of cooking the books); Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 2, 
col. 2 (executives of foreign subsidiary of Pepsico manipulated earnings figures). 
5. The Supreme Court has yet to consider the fraud on the market theory. Several circuit 
courts have accepted it in varying degrees. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), 
vacatedasmootsub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 
891 (9th Ci. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 0976). For commentator's views, see generally Fis- 
chel, Use of Modern Finance meory In Seamties Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 
38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fihel, Use of Modern Finance ZEeory]; Rapp, Rule IOb- 
5 and Fraud-on-the-Markel-Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861 
(1982); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging meory of Recovery Under SEC Rule lob-5, 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1982); Note, ZEe Fraud-on-the-Market ZEeory, 95 HARV. L. REV. ll43 
(1982). 
6. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. 
7. Decisions that have relied on the efficient market thesis include Seaboard World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d 355,361-62 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. 
Supp. 1127, 1131 n.6 @. Del. 1982); Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F. 
Supp. 1234, 1238 (D. Utah 1982); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143-45 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
The SEC recognized the efficient market thesis in developing its integrated disclosure system. 
Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383,47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 13,382, 13,384-85 (adoption ofform S-3 to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. 5 239.13); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6331,46 Fed. Reg. 41,902,41,903-04 (proposed); Sec. Act 
Rel. No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,694-96 (proposed). For a discussion of integrated disclo- 
sure, see infra notes 216-37 and accompanying text. 
Professor Daniel R. Fichel is the leading legal scholar advocating the use of the efficient 
market thesis in analyzing corporate and securities law issues. See, e.g, Easterbrook & Fischel, 
m e  Proper Role of a Target l's Management in Responding to a Tender Ofler, 94 HARV. L.REv. 1 161 
(1981); Fichel, Use of Modern Finance, supra note 5, at 1; Fischel, ZEe Low and Economics of 
DividendPolicy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fischel, m e  Low] ; Fischel, Efi- 
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prices will fully reflect all available information about the corp~ration.~ Influ- 
enced by this theory, some courts view as outdated the traditional notion that 
the investor must read the documents containing the misstatement in order to 
be mi~ led .~  
This Article traces the development of the fraud on the market theory and 
analyzes the leading cases in the area. It examines objections to the fraud on 
the market theory and discusses problems in harmonizing the theory with ex- 
plicit causes of action under the federal securities laws. Finally it explores the 
Security and Exchange Cornmission~s recognition of the efficient market thesis 
in developing the integrated disclosure system, and its application to the fraud 
on the market theory. 
Fraud on the market cases can be interpreted in two ways. Under one 
interpretation, plaintifPs burden of establishing direct reliance is eased by ac- 
cording him a presumption of indirect reliance upon showing a material mis- 
statement; reliance, in this weakened form, remains an element in rule lob-5 
cases. Under another interpretation, the reliance element is eliminated; the 
court is concerned only with ascertaining whether the violation caused plain- 
tiffinjury. Under this approach, a case involving a material misstatement be- 
comes a case of stock manipulation. 
This Article concludes that the latter "pure causation" theory, while 
cient Capita/ Market neory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender 
0 ers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 0978) [hereinafter cited as Fischel, Eflcient Capital]. See also H. d RIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION I  SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 83-88, 
96-107 (1979) (criticizing the SEC for not incorporating the efficient market thesis in its disclosure 
regulations); Pickhol & Horahan, m e  SECs Version of the Eflcient Market Theory and its Inpact 
on Securities Law Liabiliies, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (1982); Note, The Eflcient Capital 
Market Hypothesis, Economic neory and the Regulaion of the Securities Indus/ry, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 103 1 (1977). 
8. Adherents of the efficient market thesis contend that the principal tool of securities ana- 
lysts in redicting future stock prices--the use of fundamental or intrinsic value analysis to find aP underv ued or overvalued stocks-ii useless, at least for the average analyst and average inves- 
tor. Thii is so because the market has already taken into account expected events in currently 
pricing the stock. Accordingly, the current stock price is the best estimate of the stock's intrinsic 
value, and future price movements will be random. Fama, Random Walk in Stock Market Prices, 
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55, excepted in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND 
SECURITIES REGULATION 156, 157-62 (R. Posner & K. Scott eds. 1980). 
Three forms of the efficient market thesis are generally recognized as weak, semistrong, and 
strong. Weak form efficient market theorists assert that past price trends in stock prices convey no 
information about future trends. Generally, everyone except the chartists accepts the weak form. 
The theory in its semistrong form is that an investor c a ~ o t  analyze the publicly available infor- 
mation about a corporation to outpredict the market concerning its future performance. The theo- 
rists advocating the strong form contend that even those investors with access to information not 
generally available cannot outperform the market. 
Not surprisingly, many market professionals dispute the validity of the efficient market thesis 
except in the weak form. See, e.g, Bernstein, In Dfense of Fundamental Investment Analysis, 
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 57. Moreover, it is frequently observed that the thesis only 
works so long as securities analysts disbelieve it; it is their efforts to outperform the market that 
result in the market's efficiency. Eg., J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES 
AND EVIDENCE 98 (1973). 
For background on the efficient market thesis, see E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 133- 
68 (1976); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra, at 70-1 10; Fama, Eflcient CapitalMarkets: A Aevie~v 
of ZEeory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 0970). 
9. See, e.g, In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-31 (D. Del. 1982); In re 
LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142-45 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
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seemingly attractive as a principle of law and logic, marks too radical a depar- 
ture from rule lob-5's common-law origins in deceit. On the other hand, af- 
fording plaintiff a presumption of indirect reliance is appropriate whenever 
there is a basis for determining that the stock is traded in an efficient market. 
The courts should incorporate the SEC7s work on the integrated disclosure 
system to determine whether the market is efficient for the stock in issue and 
thus whether affording plaintiff a presumption of indirect reliance is appropri- 
ate. When the market is not efficient, plaintiff should bear the burden of es- 
tablishing reliance. In some instances plaintiff may meet this burden by 
demonstrating indirect reliance, such as consulting a broker or reading an in- 
vestment coIumn. In other instances, when the securities are speculative in 
nature, plaintiff should be required to show direct reliance: that he actually 
read the disclosure document. 
In rule lob-5 cases, courts initially required plaintiffs to establish, in addi- 
tion to materiality, both reliancelo and causation." These requirements were 
unquestionably appropriate and not particularly burdensome when the viola- 
tion resembled the common-law tort of deceit, as when an individual sued on 
the basis of misrepresentations made to him in direct negotiations.12 The deci- 
sion of the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas GuYSu@ur Co. ,I3 however, ex- 
panded the rule lob-5 remedy to include misstatements14 contained in 
publicly available documents. Thus, the rule lob-5 claim was no longer di- 
rectly analogous to the common-law tort.15 
Class actions, in particular, exemplified the problems resulting from 
plaintiff's required showing of reliance and causation. The amendment of rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,16 intended to expand the availa- 
10. See, e.8, Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), a f d ,  319 F.2d 
634 (7th Cir. 1963). See also List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,463 (2d Cir.) (the proper test 
for reliance is "whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act 
if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). 
11. Eg., Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978). CJ Marbury Manage- 
ment, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705,708 (2d. Cir.) (although the misrepresentation did not go to the 
intrinsic value of the securities, it induced plaintX to purchase and retain the stock; thus, the 
misrepresentation caused the transaction and the loss therefrom), cert. denied sub nom Wood 
Walker & Co. v. Marbury Management, Inc., 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). 
12. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
13. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. deniedsub nom Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 
(1969). 
14. To eliminate the need to use the cumbersome phrase "misrepresentations and omissions," 
the author uses "misstatements" to include both misrepresentations and omissions when there is 
no need to distinguish between the two. The phrases "misrepresentations" and "omissions" are 
used whenever precise usage is required. 
15. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 0983). 
16. The 1966 amendments to rule 23 reject categorization of class actions in terms of the 
abstract nature of the rights involved and instead provide more practical, functional classifica- 
tions. For an action to be maintained as a class action, it must meet the prerequisites of rule 23(a): 
numerosity, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims, and fair and adequate protec- 
tion of the interests of the class, and, in addition, one of the three subdivisions of rule 23(b). A 
securities fraud class action generally attempts to meet the requirements of rule 23@)(3): "that the 
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bility of class actions, prompted many courts to view the class action as an 
appropriate vehicle for adjudicating the liability of defendants whose misstate- 
ments affected many open market investors.17 Unless a class action could be 
maintained, investors with small losses effectively would be precluded from 
redressing their injuries.18 Since class action status under paragraph (b)(3) of 
rule 23 depends on a "predominance of common issues," defendants at- 
tempted to defeat class action certification by asserting that each plaintiff must 
show individual reliance on the misstatements to establish a rule lob-5 
claim.Ig While some courts held that the requirement of individual reliance 
made the class action inappropriate for rule lob-5 claims,2O others, unwilling 
to destroy the utility of the class action suit in securities fraud litigation, sought 
to relax or even eliminate the reliance req~irement.~' 
The court in Green v. Woy Corp. 22 proposed separate or bifurcated trials 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods 
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." The amendments also greatly increase 
judicial power and discretion to manage and supervise class actions. 
17. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); Green V. Wolf Corp., 
4% F.2d 291,298 (2d Cir. 1968), cerf. denied, 395 U.S. 977 0969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 
101 (10th Cir. 1968) ("[Alny error [in class certification], if there is to be made one, should be 
committed in favor of allowing the class action"), cerf. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). Prior to the 
revision of rule 23, Professor Loss observed that "[tlhe ultimate effectiveness of the federal reme- 
dies . . . may depend in large measure on the applicability of the class action device!' 3 L. Loss, 
supra note 2, at 1819. 
18. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Memorex Sec. 
Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 98-99 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (quoting Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 
731,733 (2d Ci. 1965), cerf. deniedsub nom Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966)). 
19. The Advisory Committee on rule 23 left unresolved whether a fraud action was appropri- 
ate for class action status: 
The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class action may be 
maintained under this subdivision, that the questions common to the class predominate 
over the questions affecting individual members. . . . [A] fraud perpetrated on numer- 
ous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a 
class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate 
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class. On the other 
hand, although having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment 
as a class action if there was material variation in the representation made or in the kinds 
or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed. 
FED. R. CN. P. 23@)(3) advisory committee note. 
20. Eg., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 306,307 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Reynolds 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566,567-69 @. Utah 1970) (Reynolds 11), affdsub nom. 
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 00th Cir. 1971). 
In Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970) (Reynolds I) the 
trial court specifically found that each of the three plaintiffs relied on the press release in making 
his decision to sell, although only one actually saw the article, and one plaintiB testified that he 
had no recollection of how he received the information. Id at 558-61. 
21. Eg., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cerf. denied, 395 U.S. 977 
(1969); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79,84-85 (M.D. Fla. 1977); In re United States Fin. Sec. 
Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24,41-44 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Kesler v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 
43, 47-49 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Werfel v. Kramarksy, 61 F.R.D. 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); I n  re 
Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99-101 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Arguably this is in contravention of the Supreme Court's authority to prescribe 
rules of procedure. Congress explicitly provided that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right" of any litigant. 28 U.S.C. $2072 0976). 
22. 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cer/. denied, 395 U.S. 977 0969). See Frankel, Some 
Preliminary Obse~atiom Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39,47 0968) (advocating the use of 
split trials in rule 23@)(3) actions). 
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as a solution to the "individual reliance-relaxed reliance" conflict. A trial is 
initially conducted on the common issue whether the defendants made any 
material  misstatement^.^^ If there is a determination adverse to defendants, 
separate trials are held on the questions of liability and damages. These ques- 
tions often turn on individual issues of reliance24 and causation. The Green 
solution of bifurcated trials, however, was correctly criticized as merely post- 
poning the inevitable: a determination on the manageability of the class 
action2= 
Accordingly, courts looked to another solution, a more objective theory 
that would make common to the class the previously subjective, individual 
issue of reliance. This was accomplished by equating materiality with reli- 
ance. In  re Memorex S e m r i ~  Cases26 is an early illustrative case. The court 
recognized its creation of different reliance requirements for negotiated and 
open market  transaction^.^^ Nevertheless, basing its decision on the desire to 
permit the use of class actions in securities fraud litigation,2* the court 
adopted an objective standard of reliance to eliminate "the overwhelming task 
of examining the subjective intent of each class member in his decision with 
respect to his 
Causation also presents problems in class action certifications. Plaintiffs 
usually are purchasers alleging that they were harmed by purchasing stock at 
prices artificially inflated by reason of defendants' actions. Defendants argue 
that any misstatement's effect on the market price would vary over time, re- 
quiring individual determination of each plainti£Ps damages and thereby mak- 
ing litigation unmanageable as a class action under rule 23(b)(3). Courts, 
however, typically downplay the significance of the damages issues.30 
23. In a fraud case involving multiple defendants and misstatements made over a period of 
time, it is debatable whether these are indeed common questions. Seesupra note 19. Most courts 
have held that they are, and have found a "common course of conduct," reasoning that the earlier 
misstatements caused the later ones to fall into error, like "standing dominoes." Eg, Herbst v. 
Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377,381 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
24. The court in Green left open the issue whether reliance was required, 406 F.2d at 301. 
25. Kg, In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 43 (S.D. Cal. 1975); see In re 
Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88,98 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Manageability is one of the factors the 
court must consider in determining class action certification under rule 23@)(3). See supra note 
16. 
26. 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
27. See id at 99-100. 
28. "[Ilt appears that reliance of the actual, subjective, individual nature necessary in the 
classical fraud case would unnecessarily encumber large lob-5 actions and thereby thwart the 
Congressional interest in providing a means by which investors may recover against market ma- 
nip~llators in federal court." Id. at 99. 
29. Id. at 100. Another early case, Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rea- 
soned that "[tlhe question of reliance, itself, may well be one of those claims typical of the claims 
of the entire class," which is one way to transform an individual issue into a common one. 
30. There are few securities opinions involving open market investors that discuss damages, 
except theoretically; most cases are settled prior to the determination of damages. Although it 
only considered limited data, one study found that settlement generally occurs before the determi- 
nation of class certification; even when certification is denied, a substantial number of cases are 
still settled. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the United States Dktrict Courlfr 
the Northern Dktrict of Texas: An Empirical Stud), 14 Hous. L. REV. 769, 797, 810-15 0977). 
Two measures of recovery are common: restitution and out of pocket loss. The former is the 
traditional measure of damages in rule lob-5 cases and was approved by the Supreme Court in 
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Two Supreme Court decisions, Mi//s v. E/ectric Auto-Lite Co. and Afl/i- 
ated Ute Citizens v. United State~,3~ furthered the demise of the subjective 
reliance element by emphasizing the objective materiality element. In Mi//s 
minority shareholders alleged, under section 14(a) of the Exchange A ~ t , 3 ~  that
shareholder approval of a merger had been obtained by means of a materially 
misleading proxy statement. The Seventh Circuit, while upholding the lower 
court's determination that the proxy statement was materially deficient, ques- 
tioned whether the misstatements had caused the shareholders any harm.34 
The court noted that in a common-law action for fraud plaintiff would have to 
establish reliance on the misstatement. Because "[rleliance by thousands of 
individuals, as here, can scarcely be inquired into,"35 however, the Seventh 
Circuit decided that the determinative issue was the fairness of the merger 
terms. It reasoned that if the terms were fair the shareholders suffered no 
AEiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972), involving direct negotiations. 
See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text. For open market investors, the better view is that 
out of pocket recovery should be used, ie.,  the difference between what was paid for the stock and 
what it was actually worth at the time of the transaction. Eg., Huddleston v. Herman & 
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,555-56 (5th Cir.), mod@ed on other grounds mem., 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 
1981), ofdinpart, rev'dinpart on other ground, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. 
Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a f d m e m ,  556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1977). See Note, The Measure 
of Damages in Rule IOb-5 Cases Involvrig Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974). 
A variation of the out of pocket measure is that plaintiffs recover the difference between what they 
paid and the value of the securities at the time the fraud is or should have been discovered. Eg., 
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94,105 (10th Cir. 1968), cerf. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). CJ Harris v. 
American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220,226-27 (8th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs recover the difference between 
what they paid and the stock's value at the time knowledge of the fraud is publicly disseminated), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 0976). When the complaint is that plaintiffs paid an inflated price for 
the stock, those plaintiffs who sold the stock during the period of inflated price must have their 
recovery reduced by the amount of recaptured inflated value. Green v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335,1345 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curium) (Sneed, J., concurring). Courts adopt- 
ing the fraud on the market theory believe that the actual value of the stock over the period can be 
determined by expert testimony; accordingly, awarding the appropriate recovery to each plaintin 
becomes mechanical. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 816 (1976); see In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 148-49 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
Notwithstanding the above, some courts have stated that it is within the trial court's discre- 
tion to apply a rescissionary measure of recovery, ie., the difference between the price paid and 
the stock's value at a later date, usually either the date of sale of the stock or the date the suit is 
instituted. See, e.8, Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cerf, denied, 429 U.S. 
816 (1976); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970) (not an open 
market transaction). This method promotes manageability of a class action, because it eliminates 
both the necessity of determining the stock's varying theoretical value over the relevant time pe- 
riod and the problems of conflicts between class members who sold the stock and those who did 
not. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., 
concurring). The flaw in the rescissionary measure is that it permits laintiffs to recover for all 
declines in the stock price, even those caused by factors unrelated to t g e misstatement: "Wrong- 
doing defendants should not be mulcted to make simple the management of a class proceeding 
under rule lob-5." Id. Compare Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,555 (5th Cir.), 
modjFed on other ground mem 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), a f j  in part, rev'd in part on other 
ground, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (rescission measure rejected) with Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & 
Co., 570 F.2d 38,49 (2d Cir.) (rescission measure applied, but reduced to reflect decline in general 
market conditions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). See Note, supra, at 386. 
31. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
32. 406 U.S. 128 0972). 
33. 15 U.S.C. 3 78n(a) 0976). 
34. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968). 
35. Id. at 436 n.10. 
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injury, because a sufficient number of them would have voted to authorize the 
merger even if there had been accurate disclosure. 
The Supreme Court, although vacating the Seventh Circuit's opinion, 
agreed that the court could not examine individual issues of reliance.36 It dis- 
approved, however, of the appeals court's alternative of reviewing the fairness 
of the merger terms.37 Instead, the Court emphasized the requirement of ma- 
t e r i a l i t ~ ~ ~  as a substitute for proof of individual reliance. Thus, in Mills the 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized, in a section 14(a) action, the practical 
considerations of maintaining a class action as a rationale for eliminating 
proof of individual reliance.39 
Both section 14(a) and rule 14a-9,4O on the one hand, and section lo@) 
and rule lob-5, on the other, are implied remedies for false and misleading 
statements. Mih, however, is distinguishable from rule lob-5 cases on several 
significant grounds. First, when shareholders bring suit based on a misleading 
proxy statement sent to them as part of a proxy solicitation process, reliance is 
more appropriately presumed because there is a greater likelihood that at least 
4 sizeable number of those in the plaintiff class have read some portions of the 
d0cument.4~ Second, a shareholder is directly harmed, whether or not he 
reads the proxy statement, or even if he reads it and is not misled, if a suffi- 
cient number of shareholders are misled by the proxy statement to vote in 
favor of the proposed acti0n.4~ Third, courts tend to recognize a more direct 
connection between misstatement and harm in the context of a proxy solicita- 
ti0n.4~ Finally, the number of plaintiffs is determinable, although it may be 
36. Mill, 396 U.S. at 380. 
37. In the Court's view, this approach would immunize all misstatements that did not relate 
to the merger terms and would discourage shareholders from brinrring actions to enforce the proxy 
- - - . . 
rules. Id. i t  382. 
38. "There is no need to supplement this [materiality] requirement. . . with a requirement of 
proof of whether the defect actually had a decisive effect on the voting. Where there has been a 
finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between 
the violation and the injury . . . ." Id. at 384-85. 
39. The Court left open the questions whether there would be causation when management 
controlled enough votes to assure authorization of the transaction, but referred to a district court 
case that held there would be sufficient causation in this situation. Id. at 385 n.7. Lower courts in 
the Second Circuit have split on this issue. See Schlick v. Pen-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 
374, 378 n.7 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 0979, and cases cited therein. 
40. 17 C.F.R. 3 240.14a-9 0983). 
41. The proxy rules are very likely the most effective disclosure device in the SEC 
scheme of things. The proxy literature, unlike the application for re&ration and the 
statutory rePo& gets &to t6e hands of investors. ~ & e  the securities Act prospectus, 
it gets there in time. It is more readable than any of these other documents. And it gets 
t o a  great many people who never see a prospectus. 
- 
3 L. Loss,mpra note 2, at 1027. The length and complexity of the typical merger proxy statement, 
however, may deter shareholders from reading it. Freund & Greene, Substance Over Form S - l k  
A Propodto Reform SECRegulaion of NegotidedAcqui~ions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1483, 1493 0981). 
42. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,269 (3d Cir.) (that some share- 
holders discovered misstatement before vote on the merger not a defense to rule lob-5 violation 
involving proxy solicitation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Hershfang v. Knotter, [1982-83 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,203 (E.D. Va. April 25,1983) (plaintiff has standing 
to assert 3 14(a) claim despite apparent lack of reliance). 
43. Because of this recognition of more direct harm, courts have found negligence the appro- 
priate standard of culpability in $ 14(a) damage claims, notwithstanding the requirement of scien- 
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large. Because of these siflcant distinctions, the M f i  rationale is not suffi- 
ciently persuasive authority for abandoning the reliance requirement in rule 
lob-5 actions. 
The Supreme Court opinion, A'Ziated Ute Citizens v. UnitedStates,M ad- 
dressed the reliance requirement in a rule lob-5 case involving rather unusual 
facts. Plaintiffs, mixed-bloods of the Ute Indian Tribe, sued a bank and two of 
its employees. The bank had acted as transfer agent for stock of a corporation 
formed for the purpose of distributing tribal assets. Although the bank had 
been requested to discourage resales of the stock, its employees had actively 
encouraged a secondary market among non-Indians. Indeed, they had "de- 
vised a plan and induced the mixed-blood holders of [the] stock to dispose of 
their shares without disclosing to them material facts that reasonably could 
have been expected to influence their decisions to sell."45 The Supreme Court 
held that the appeals court had read rule lob-5 too restrictively in requiring 
evidence that plaintiffs had relied on misstatements made by the employees, 
since "[as market makers] they possessed the afiirmative duty under the Rule 
to disclose this fact to the mixed-blood sellers."46 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the distinction between para- 
graph (2) of rule lob-5, on the one hand, and paragraphs (1) and (3), on the 
other.47 While the former premises liability on material misstatements, and 
thus is closely related to common-law fraud$* the latter provisions are 
broader, encompassing " 'a course of business' or a device, scheme or artifice" 
that operates as a fraudFg Accordingly: 
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to 
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. 
All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material . , . . This 
obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact estab- 
lish the requisite element of causation in fact.50 
Despite the unique facts ofAflZiated Ute, which suggest its applicability is 
limited to situations involving direct negotiations between purchaser and 
seller," it has been widely interpreted as eliminating plaintiffs need to estab- 
lish reliance in nondisclosure cases involving open market transactions.52 
Based on AflZiated Ute, courts accord plaintiff a presumption of reliance in 
~ 
ter in rule lob-5 cases. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,777-78 (3d Cir. 1976); 
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1973). 
44. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
45. Id. at 153. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 152-53. For text of rule lob-5, see supra note 1. 
48. For discussion of common-law fraud elements, see supra note 2. 
49. A'liated Ule, 406 U.S. at 153. 
50. Id. at 153-54. 
51. The Court found a duty to disclose because it found the relationship between plaintifl's 
and the bank employees comparable to a fiduciary relationship. See Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 230 0980) (no duty to disclose in absence of fiduciary relationship). 
52. E.g, Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978); Rifkin v. 
Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262-63 (5th Ci. 1978); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466,471 
(E.D. Pa. 1974). See infra note 148. 
Heinonline - -  62 N.C. L. Rev 4 4 4  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4  
19841 PR4 UD ON TUE MARKET 445 
nondisclosure cases and, in so doing, shift the burden to defendant to prove 
plaintiti's n~nrel iance .~~ Some courts extend Aflliated Ute further and hold 
that, in open market transactions involving misrepresentations, plaintiff need 
prove only material it^:^ thus eliminating the distinction between misrepre- 
sentations and omissions.55 
Two significant Second Circuit opinions, Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement 
Corp .56 and Chris- Craft Industries v. Pper Aircraft Coy. ,57 developed the Af- 
filiated Ute distinction between misrepresentations and fraudulent schemes.58 
They held that victims of schemes to manipulate stock prices need only estab- 
lish causation and not reliance.59 
In S~hliCk,6~ brought under rule lob-5, plaintiff challenged a merger be- 
tween two affiliated corporations in which an exchange ratio unfair to the mi- 
nority shareholders allegedly had been achieved through the majority 
shareholder's stock manipulation. The district court dismissed the complaint 
"for want of the necessary causal co~ection."6~ The appeals court acknowl- 
edged that a plaintiff in a misrepresentations case would have to show reliance 
and that a plaintiff in an omissions case would have to show materiality. 
When, however, plaintiff alleged a fraudulent scheme involving market ma- 
nipulation, of which misstatements were but one aspect, he need only show 
causation. Plaintiff satisfied this requirement by alleging that the minority 
shareholders were forced to exchange their stock on the basis of an unfair 
exchange ratio. Plaintiff thus established his claim upon a showing that the 
fraudulent scheme caused his economic 
53. E Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,410 (3d Ci. 1974); Sargent v. Genesco, 
Inc., 75 F . ~ D .  79, 85 (M.D. Fla. 1977). 
54. Eg., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 874 (1972). See also Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir.) (reliance not an 
independent element necessary to establish cause of action), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970). 
55. Eg., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88,93 (2d Cir. 1981). The 
Third Circuit rejected the omission-misrepresentation distinction in assigning the burden of proof 
on reliance, in favor of a flexible approach. The Third Circuit required the court to "analyze the 
plaintifs allegations, in light of the likely proof at trial, and determine the most reasonable place- 
ment of the burden of proof of reliance." Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,188 (3d Cir. 
1981), cerf. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). Seealso H e m  v. Stafford, 461 F. Supp. 508,514-15 (W.D. 
Ky. 1978) (allegations involving misrepresentations and omissions cannot be strictly categorized); 
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 84 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (too simplistic to categorize claims as 
involving either misrepresentations or omissions). 
That the distinction between omissions and misrepresentations can be determinative is illus- 
trated by comparing Vewaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978), with Dekro 
v. Stem Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 
56. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 0975). 
57. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 0973). 
58. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
59. Accord Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Aii Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. de- 
nied, 400 U.S. 822 0970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
970 (1967). 
60. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). 
61. Id. at 378. The district court also apparently did not think that the alleged violations 
stated a claim under federal law. Id. at 377 n.5. 
62. In Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 
(1967), also involving a forced merger, the court regarded reliance as unnecessary in a case in 
which plaintiff had no choice but to relinquish his shares. 
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In Chris-Crafr Industries v. P@er Aircraft C o p  ,63 Chris-Craft, the de- 
feated tender offeror in the struggle to obtain control of Piper Aircraft, sued 
Bangor Punta, the successful tender offeror, for misstatements made during 
the tender offer. The Second Circuit held that Chris-Craft could maintain 
such a claim under section 14(e) of the Exchange even though it had not 
relied on Bangor Punta's alleged misstatements, since Chris-Craft's harm did 
not depend "upon the exercise of volition by [it], but instead upon the exercise 
of volition by other persons."65 
The Supreme Court dismissed Chris-Craft's suit on the ground that a de- 
feated tender offeror lacks standing to sue for damages under section 14(e).66 
In addition, the Court noted, in dictum, that Chris-Craft would not have had 
standing had it brought its claim as a Piper stockholder: 
As a tender offeror actively engaged in competing for Piper stock, 
Chris-Craft was not in the posture of a target shareholder confronted 
with the decision of whether to tender or retain its stock. Conse- 
quently, Chris-Craft could scarcely have alleged a need for the dis- 
closures mandated by the Williams 
From this language it appears that the Court contemplated a direct reliance 
requirement in cases under section 14(e) involving  misstatement^.^^ In another 
part of the opinion, however, the Court indicated that Chris-Craft would have 
had standing to litigate Bangor Punta's rule lob-6 violations69 if Chris-Craft 
had alleged that it paid an inflated price for Piper stock because of Bangor 
Punta's fraudulent scheme: if it had sued as "a hoodwinked investor victim- 
ized by market manip~lation."~~ 
The Supreme Court's Chris-Craft opinion thus supports the view that, un- 
like a plaintiff alleging injury because of misstatements, a plaintiff alleging 
injury because of a stock manipulation scheme need not show reliance. The 
former claim, essentially a common-law deceit case, is based on paragraph (2) 
of rule lob-5, while the stock manipulation claim is based on paragraphs (1) 
and (3). The difficulty with this analysis is drawing a distinction between mis- 
statements that affect the stock's price and other forms of stock manipula- 
tion,7l since any material misstatement will affect the stock's price. 
63. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). 
64. 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(e) (1976). 
65. Chris-Craf, 480 F.2d at 373. 
66. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 430 U.S. 1 (1976). 
67. Id. at 35. 
68. Since 5 14(e) was patterned after rule lob-5, courts look to decisions interpreting 5 14(e) 
for guidance in interpreting rule lob-5. 
69. Chrk-CraJ, 430 U.S. at 43-44. Rule lob-6 generally prohibits a participant in a securities 
distribution from bidding for or purchasing securities of the same class. 17 C.F.R. $240.10b-6 
(1983). Its purpose is to prevent manipulation of the stock prke to facilitate its distribution. See 
Proposed Amendment to Rule lob-6, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,482, 11,483 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
5 240.106-6) (proposed Mar. 3, 1982). 
70. Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 45. 
71. See infra note 137. 
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There is no uniform fraud on the market theory; rather, the theory takes 
three forms, represented by three leading cases. In Blackie v. B a r r a ~ k ~ ~  plain- 
tiffs brought a class action, seeking to represent purchasers of a corporation's 
common stock over a twenty-seven month period. They alleged that some 
forty-five documents released publicly by the corporation contained material 
misstatements that artificially inflated the price of the stock. Defendants re- 
sisted class action certification by asserting, among other arguments, that di- 
rect proof of subjective reliance by each class member was necessary to 
establish rule lob-5 liability. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating 
that subjective reliance was not a distinct element of proof in rule lob-5 claims 
involving open market transactions.73 
First, the court noted that plaintiffs' substantive claims were or could be 
stated in terms of 0missions.7~ Relying onA'liated the court held that 
"positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery."76 Second, and 
more significantly, the court treated the claims as involving misrepresentations 
and relied on precedent for the following proposition: 
Proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is un- 
necessary to establish a lob-5 claim for a deception inflating the price 
of stock traded in the open market. . . . Proof of reliance is adduced 
to demonstrate the causal connection between the defendant's 
wrongdoing and the plaintss loss. We think causation is ade- 
quately established in the impersonal stock exchange context by 
proof of purchase and of the materiality of misrepresentations, with- 
out direct proof of reliance. Materiality circumstantially establishes 
the reliance of some market traders and hence the inflation in the- 
stock price-when the purchase is made the causational chain be- 
tween defendant's conduct and plaintiif's loss is sufficiently estab- 
lished to make out a prima facie case.77 
The court's discussion of the role of reliance in a rule lob-5 claim is sub- 
ject to two interpretations. Under the prevailing view, reliance is not elimi- 
nated as an element in establishing a rule lob-5 claim. Rather, plaintiff is 
afforded a rebuttable presumption of indirect reliance, necessarily easing his 
72. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
73. Id. at 905. 
74. For example; the corporation's financial statements failed to disclose the need for ade- 
quate reserves. One commentator has criticized the court of appeals' reasoning, since in the con- 
text of a reporting corporation these so-called omissions are really failures to disclose information 
necessary to prevent already available information from being misleading, or half-truths, which 
are treated as misrepresentations. Ruder, Judicial Developments Under Rule IOb-5: Standing, Sci- 
enter, Reliance, Materialily and Implied Rights of Action, 7 INST. ON SEC. REG. 303, 325 (1976). 
Afiliafed Ute, however, can also be interpreted as a misrepresentation case, since the failure to 
disclose that higher prices were available in the secondary market was also an implied misrepre- 
sentation that the offered price was fair. 
75. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
76. 524 F.2d at 905 (quotingAfifiated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153). 
77. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906. 
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burden in establishing a prima facie case.78 Thus, the purchaser in open mar- 
ket transactions indirectly relies on the accuracy of the corporation's public 
documents, since "he relies generally on the supposition that the market price 
is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the 
price."79 
A defendant has four defenses under the prevailing view. The first two 
are common to the class as a whole and relate to materiality and causation, 
The remaining two are specific rebuttals of an individual plaintiffs reliance. 
First, defendant can disprove the materiality of the mis~tatement.~O If it was 
not material, any disparity between price and value must have been due to 
factors not attributable to defendant's misconduct. Second, even if the mis- 
statement was material, defendant can defeat plaintifYs claim by showing that 
an insufficient number of traders relied on it, and that the price was not af- 
fected by it.s1 This would be the case when sophisticated traders saw through 
the misstatements2 or when information from other sources discredited it.83 
Third, defendant could prove that an individual plaintiff had purchased de- 
spite his knowledge of the material misstatement. Fourth, defendant could 
prove that an individual plaintiff would have purchased even if he had known 
of the falsity.84 In the latter two defenses, defendant uses plaintifPs nonreli- 
ance to limit the chain of causation.85 
BZackie also can be interpreted as a "pure causation" approach to rule 
lob-5 liability. Under this view, the only purpose of reliance is to establish 
causation;86 when causation can be established by other means, a showing of 
reliance becomes unnecessary. For example, in open market transactions cau- 
78. The Blackie court characterized a requirement of direct reliance as an "unreasonable and 
irrelevant evidentiary burden." Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907. 
79. Id. The court inIn re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134,144 (N.D. Tex. 1980), extended the 
analysis by basing a presumption of indirect reliance on the efficient market thesis: 
Many investors . . . utilize the very efficiency of the market as the affirmative basis for 
making securities purchases. These investors rely directly on the market to evaluate in- 
formation for them rather than making their independent analysis of stocks, any reliance 
of the market on information is thus reliance by these investors. 
Id See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
80. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906. 
81. Id 
82. For studies concluding that investors are not fooled by accounting practices that cause an 
apparent increase in profitability, see Fischel, Llse of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 5, at 6 
n.19. See aho Fischel, The Law, supra note 7, at 720-21. 
83. See, e.g, Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770,786 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
84. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906. 
85. Professor Fischel correctly notes that allowing these defenses of nonreliance is logically 
inconsistent, since defendants caused these plaintiffs economic injury, and criticizes Blackie for 
applying the traditional tort elements to the fraud on the market theory. See Fischel, Use of 
Modern Finance Theory, supra note 5,  at 11. Blackie's ap roach, however, can be rationalized :f 
based on judicial concern that defendants' potential liab' IE 'ty would otherwise be too great. See 
Dooley, 22e EHects of Civil Liabifiy on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. 
REV. 776, 819 11.203 (1972); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Paim for the Development of 
Federal Coporathn Law Under Rule IOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1370-71 (1965). In add:- 
tion, defendants should not be liable to those who knowingly assumed the risk of the investment. 
86. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 976 (1975). CJ Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 
1981) ('The element of reliance serves to restrict the potentially limitless thrust of rule lob-5 to 
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sation is established by showing that the misstatement is material because a 
sufficient number of market traders relied on it to cause the price increase.87 
Injury, therefore, is suffered by all who purchased the stock between the date 
when the material misstatement affected the price and the date when the truth 
was sufficiently disseminated to bring the price of the stock down to its "true" 
value. Thus, a material misstatement establishes plaintzs prima facie case. 
The only defense is to defeat the showing of causation by either of the first two 
defenses discussed above. Under the pure causation approach, the remaining 
two defenses relating to issues of individual reliance are irrelevant. 
Many courts, assuming that BZackie is an extension ofAflZiated Ute's pre- 
sumption of reliance, adopt the fist interpretation ofBZackie and state that the 
presumption is reb~t table .~~ PlaintifE's nonreliance can then be raised defen- 
~ i v e l y : ~ ~  that plaintiff did not read the report;gO that he did not request to see 
those situations in which there exists causation in fact between the defendant's act and the plain- 
tiff's injury!'). 
87. The post-Blackie fraud on the market cases were brought by purchasers alleging artificial 
orice inflation because manaeement concealed unfavorable data. Similarlv. investors who sell 
Ghile a stock price is artificially depressed, because management concealed &"orable information 
would also suffer economic iniurv. A fraud on the market case alleging artificial depression with- 
out insider trading is unlikeli, imce corporate insiders have an inkGive to con& good news 
only long enough to purchase the stock at bargain prices. In the absence of insider trading, the 
corporation would be liable under rule lob-5 only if it had a duty to disclose the favorable data. 
Courts normally do not question the timing of the corporation's disclosure; instead they ques- 
tion the adequacy of the disclosure. See, e.8, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The timing of the disclosure, in the absence of insider 
trading or prior inaccurate disclosure, falls within management discretion, which is protected by 
the business judgment rule. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 851-52 
(2d Cir. 1981); see S t a h  v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982). But see Allen, m e  
Disclosure Obligation of Public& Held Corpoatiom in the Absence of lmider Trading, 25 MERCER 
L. REV. 479,496 (1974) ("[Tlhere seems to be an evolving concept of a duty of full disclosure to 
the securities markets in general, even in the absence of insider trading."); Bauman, Rule lob-5 
and the Corporation's A'mative Duty to DkcZose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935, 988 (1979) ("Only a disclo- 
sure duty that applied irrespective of trading will fully meet the informational needs of 
investors!'). 
88. E.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254,259 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Sullivan 
v. Chase Inv. Services, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246,262 (N.D. Cal. 1978). One court has gone so far as to 
say that although A'liated Ute relaxes the reliance requirement, plaintiff must at least demon- 
strate an awareness of the corporate document. Kennedy v. Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 
(N.D. Ill. 1981). 
89. Jezarian v. Csapo, [I980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) fl 97,692 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980); see Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla. 
1982). Other cases involve decisions on class certification, when the assertions of individual non- 
reliance were used as arguments against class certification. Eg., Arthur Young & Co. v. United 
States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cu.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). It appears, how- 
ever, that the courts viewed nonreliance as a means of defeating plaintias substantive claim and 
not, as defendants urged, as grounds to defeat class certification. See Markewich v. Ersek, [1981- 
1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,213 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Beissinger v. Rockwood 
Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. PA. 1981); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254,258-60 
(N.D. Ill. 1981); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex 1980); .Tanzer v. Sharon Steel 
Corp., [I979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) fl 96,915 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Greenspan v. 
Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). CJ Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 174 
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (when plaintiffs allege fraud on the market, the "speculative possibility that the 
defendants may have a right to show nonreliance . . . is not enough to defeat a class action"). 
90. Tanzer v. Sharon Steel Corp., [I979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,915 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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the report;g1 that he relied on another's re~ommendation;9~ that he made the 
investment decision for reasons unrelated to the  misstatement^;^^ that he knew 
the falsity of the ~ta ternent ;~~ or, that he relied on his own investigati~n.~~ 
A few courts adopt the second interpretation and read Blackie as a pure 
causation ~ a s e . 9 ~  They reason that there is general reliance on the market to 
employ all available information to set a price reflecting the actual value of the 
s to~k.9~ This reliance has been found even when a plaintiff testified that she 
did not consider the price of the stock when she decided to buy it.g8 
The most extreme form of the pure causation approach is exemplified by 
a decision in which plaintiff sold the stock short, anticipating a price decline, 
and claimed injury because the price actually rose, allegedly on the basis of 
subsequent material misstaternent~.~~ The district court, while doubting that 
fraud on the market was the law in its circuit, nevertheless permitted plaintiff 
to recover under the most expansive theory of fraud on the market. Clearly 
the plaintiff could not have relied on the misstatement in any sense, and the 
court permitted recovery solely on the basis of economic loss. Other courts 
have not clearly articulated their understanding of B/ackie.lOO 
91. Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770,786 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
92. Id. at 786-87; Kiernan v. Homeland, Inc., 61 1 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980); Markewich V. 
Ersek, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 198,213 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Greenspan 
v. Brassier, 78 F.R.D. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
93. Kiernan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980). 
94. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla. 
1982). 
95. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1977). 
96. The Ninth Circuit, in its later opinion, Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 
549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), was ambiguous in its interpretation of 
Blackie. The court acknowledged that Blackie permits defendants to introduce evidence of an 
individual plaintas nonreliance to "disprove the causal relationship between defendants' wrong- 
ful conduct and plaintill's decision to invest." Id at 695. Nevertheless, the court found defend- 
ants' offer of proof on nonreliance insignificant on the class certification issue. Moreover, 
discussion of Blackie in another part of the opinion suggests that this court is moving close to 
dispensing with reliance altogether. See id at 694-95. In addition, since defendants' ability to 
defeat the presumption of reliance is largely theoretical in class actions, as a practical matter 
reliance is eliminated as an element. 
[qhe  possibility that defendants may attempt to rebut the presumption of reliance as to 
each class member is not enough to defeat class action. . . . It is unrealistic. . . to now 
assume that because reliance would only be "presumed" the supposed common issue will 
unravel into thousands of unmanageable "mini-trials." This is true, given the force of 
the presumption (carrying a burden of proving a purchase would have been made even if 
the truth were known) with the resulting reality that the contest would likely be futile in 
the vast number of cases. 
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
97. See Shores v. Sklar, 610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980). aTd en banc, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir, 
.I. U 
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. ~ t :  722 (1983); ~ause t t  v. Amencan Resources Management ~ o r p . ,  542 
F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982). 
9i.- ~ b r a m s  v. ~ohns-~anvi l le  Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
7 98,348 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In another case, involving omissions, the court thought it "dubious" 
that proof of nonreliance would defeat the claim. Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
' 
99. ~auset;  v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982). 
See also Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). 
100. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980) is 
often cited as an early espousal of the fraud on the market theory, but its interpretation of Blackie 
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Panzirer v. WoTo1 shows a second form of the fraud on the market the- 
ory. Plaintiff purchased stock in a corporation that subsequently declared 
bankruptcy. She charged that there were material misstatements in its annual 
report, which she conceded she had not read. Rather, she decided to purchase 
the stock after reading a newspaper column reporting favorably on the corpo- 
ration's prospects and after speaking to her broker. She claimed that the arti- 
cle would not have been so optimistic if the annual report had been accurate. 
The Second Circuit, reversing the trial court,102 held that plaintifs theory 
stated a causal connection between her loss and the annual report; thus plain- 
t a s  theory could not be dismissed on summary judgment. 
While the Second Circuit saw its decision as a logical extension of Black- 
ie, it noted a critical distinction between the two cases. The court viewed 
Blackie as a case of indirect reliance on the market price to reflect the worth of 
the stock, as determined by the publicly available information. In Woy, how- 
ever, plaintiff did not rely on the market price in making her investment deci- 
sion.lo3 Nevertheless, the court found that plaintiff did rely indirectly on the 
annual report because she reasonably could expect that the "information 
heard on the street" would accurately reflect the information contained 
therein.lo4 Hence, plaintiff was entitled to prove that if the report were accu- 
rate, the article would not have mentioned the future prospects sf the corpora- 
tion favorably, and she would not have purchased the stock.lo5 
Although characterizing its decision as one involving indirect reliance, the 
court really dispenses altogether with the reliance requirement. While it 
speaks of a fraud on the market plaintiff having a "presumption of reliance," 
the court does not develop this concept and provides no analysis of what, if 
anything, would rebut this presumption.lo6 The opinion makes clear, how- 
- - - -- ~~~~~ -- 
is unclear. The court stated that in rule lob-5 cases, reliance is presumed when the material 
misrepresentation affected the price of stock traded on the open market. Id. at 553. The court did 
not address the issue whether this presumption is rebuttable. In another part of the opinion, the 
court implied that it is rebuttable, since it made reference to "open market investors who relied on 
misleading market information." Id at 556. Cf. Pellman v. Cierama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (suggestion that even proof of nonreliance will not defeat rule lob-5 claim involv- 
ing omissions). 
101. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacatedas moot, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982). 
102. The trial court held that plaintiff had relied primarily on the newspaper article in making 
her decision to purchase the stock, and thus her reliance on the integrity of the market was only 
secondary. Panzirer v. Wolf, 11979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) fl 97,251 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), modjFed by [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) a 97,363 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
' 103. The &urt observed that the attractiveness of the investment would be enhanced by a 
lower price. WOK 663 F.2d at 367 n.3. 
104. Id. at 368. 
105. Where the plaintiff acts upon information from those working in or reporting on the 
securities markets, and where that information is circulated after a material misrepresen- 
tation or omission, plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of reliance on the misrepresenta- 
tion or omission. 
Id. at 367. The court found that plaintiR's lack of credibility, however, made her an inadequate 
class representative under rule 23(a)(4). Id at 368. 
106. Referring to its earlier decision in Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Hor- 
wath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cu. 1975), the court stated that "the fact that plaintiff must 
trace her reliance on defendant's alleged fraud through the reactions of third parties does not 
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ever, that plaintas failure to rely on the market price does not rebut the pre- 
sumption. Instead, the opinion emphasizes the chain of causation linking the 
alleged misstatement to plaintifPs investment decision. Thus, the Second Cir- 
cuit's WoY opinion can be characterized as a pure causation case. 
Shores v. Sklarlo7 represents the third form of the fraud on the market 
theory. Plaintiff had purchased revenue bondslo* that dropped drastically in 
value shortly after their sale due to default by the lessee of the industrial busi- 
ness premises. Plaintiff admitted that he had not seen the offering circular, but 
bought the bonds because of his broker's recommendations. He alleged that 
the issuance of the bonds resulted from a fraudulent scheme "so pervasive that 
without it the issuer could not have issued, the dealer could not have dealt in, 
and the buyer would not have bought these Bonds, because they would not 
have been offered on the market at any price."lo9 The district court entered 
summary judgment for the defendants, because the plaintiff had not relied on 
the circular's alleged misstatements. The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning as 
follows: 
The securities laws and regulations have a purpose broader than 
merely criticizing ever-lengthening, complex prospectuses. They 
cover deliberate, manipulative schemes to defraud which can annul 
not only the purpose of disclosure but also the market's honest 
functi0n.l lo 
Accordingly, while plaintifPs failure to read the circular barred him from 
asserting that it contained material misstatements under rule lob-5(2), plaintiff 
had stated a claim, under paragraphs (1) and (3) of the rule, based on fraud in 
bringing the bonds to the market.I1l If plaintiff proved that he was willing to 
purchase any bonds that were "entitled to be marketed"l12 and that he was 
willing to accept any marketable risk, he would establish his reliance on "the 
integrity of the offerings of the securities market."lI3 Causation would be es- 
tablished by proving defendant's scheme to defraud investors by offering 
bonds not entitled to be marketed. 
In analyzing the distinctions between rule lob-5 claims under paragraphs 
(1) and (3), on the one hand, and paragraph (2), on the other, the Fifth Circuit 
stated the following: 
~p ~p ~-p ~~-p ~ 
vitiate her claim under lob-5." Wo$ 663 F.2d at 368. Seealso Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 
545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980), discussedsupra note 100. But see Axelrod v. 
Cities Service Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,131 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
17, 1983) (because plaintiff did not directly rely on disclosure document, he would be subject to 
atypical defense in class action and thus was inadequate class representative). 
107. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cerf. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983). The judges of 
the Fifth Circuit were split 12-10 in this decision. 
108. Although revenue bonds are not required to be registered under the Securities Act, 15 
U.S.C. 8 77c(a)(2) (1982), offers and sales of bonds are not exempt from the antifraud provisions 
of either that Act, id 5 77q(a), or the Exchange Act, id 5 78j(b). 
109. Shores, 647 F.2d at 464 n.2. 
110. Id. at 464. 
111. See supra .note 1 (text of rule lob-5). 
112. Shores, 647 F.2d at 471. 
113. Id. at 469. 
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Whenever the Rule lob-5 issue shifts from misrepresentation or 
omission in a document to fraud on a broader scale, the search for 
causation must shift also. . . . [Rlule lob-5 is not limited to a nar- 
row right to recover for knowing fraudulent misrepresentations or 
omissions in disclosure documents which mislead a securities buyer. 
The rule is recognized also to provide a basis for a federal cause of 
action for more elaborate, intentional schemes which deceive or de- 
fraud purchasers of securities.' l4 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit relies on the same distinction between garden-variety 
misstatements and large-scale fraud, drawn inl ' l iated Ute and developed in 
the stock manipulation cases of the Second Circuit, as a basis for its version of 
fraud on the market theory.115 
The Shores version of the fraud on the market theory, followed in the 
Tenth Circuit and in a number of lower courts,l l6 differs from Blackie by not 
affording plaintiff a presumption of indirect reliance on the offering circular 
that would allow plaintiff to state a claim under rule lob-5(2). Since Shores 
involved municipal bonds, which generally are not widely followed by ana- 
lysts or heavily traded, it would have been inappropriate to extend to plaintiff 
the Blackie presumption of indirect reliance; the information contained in the 
offering circular would not be readily available in the marketp1ace.l l7 Thus, 
the Shores court probably was conrect in dismissing the claims based on fraud- 
ulent misstatements, although the lack of evidence about the nature of the 
broker's recommendations and the source of his information is curious. Nev- 
ertheless, the court's distinction between facts that merely decrease the securi- 
ties' value, on the one hand, and facts that make the securities valueless and 
hence unmarketable, on the other, is a difficult one to draw, if it is a distinction 
at all, since someone would always buy the securities at some price.l18 In 
subsequent cases courts have been receptive to plaintiffs' assertions that the 
misstatements made the securities unmarketab1e.l l9 This expansive reading of 
Shores converts this version of fraud on the market into a pure causation case 
with repect to all forms of misstatements. 
From a review of these cases, it appears that those courts that have 
adopted some version of the fraud on the market theory are motivated by a 
strong concern for protecting the open market investor. Accordingly, they rea- 
son that the requirement of reliance developed because of rule lob-5's close 
resemblance to the common-law tort of deceit. They argue that even though 
114. Id. at 472. 
115. See supra notes 44-71 and accompanying text. 
116. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th 
Cir. 1983); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 11982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) Ij 99,224 (W.D. Mo. April 18,1983); In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., [1982-83 Trans- 
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Ij 99,157 (S.D. Calif. March 24, 1983); Lipton v. Documation, 
Inc., [I982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Ij 98,788 (M.D. Fla. August 18,1982); Dekro 
v. Stem Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 
F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
117. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. 
118. See Shorm, 647 F.2d at 486 (Randall, J., dissenting). 
119. See supra note 116. 
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the requirement may still be appropriate in negotiated transactions, today's 
rule lob-5 claim alleging fraud on a large scale has moved light-years away 
from the common-law tort.120 Open market investors victimized by fraud, as 
a distinct class of litigants, should have a remedy; open market investors who 
bought the stock at a price substantially different from its intrinsic value cer- 
tainly have been injured; to impose a direct reliance requirement, therefore, is 
to bar arbitrarily certain plaintifTs who suffered the same injury as those who 
can fortuitously establish direct reliance. Moreover, these courts believe that 
enforcement of the securities laws is most effectively achieved through class 
actions,121 which in turn can only be maintained if the fraud on the market 
theory is available to eliminate individual issues of reliance.lZ2 Accordingly, 
courts have looked for ways of replacing proof of individual reliance with 
proof of a common and more objective reliance. 
The argument for acceptance of the fraud on the market theory is fre- 
quently summarized in B/ackieYs assertion that an investor has the right to rely 
on "the supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsus- 
pected manipulation has artificially inflated the price."123 Hence, it is argued 
that if an investor establishes his reliance on the market price he has met his 
reliance requirement in establishing a prima facie case under rule lob-5. Im- 
plicit in this argument is an acceptance of the efficient market thesis, which 
states that publicly available information affecting a corporation's prospects is 
rapidly absorbed by the market, that the information has an immediate impact 
on the stock price,lZ4 and that the marketplace reacts to both true and false 
data.125 Thus, in an attenuated way, every investor "relies" on any false infor- 
mation when he purchases stock at the prevailing market price. 
An investor, however, by trading in the stock, necessarily must accept the 
risk that the stock's price varies from its value. The availability of a good deal 
of information about a corporation provides no assurance that it is accurate 
information. Moreover, even if the information is factually accurate, it is sub- 
ject to misinterpretation by the market.lZ6 While an investor necessarily must 
120. Recent Supreme Court opinions lend support to this view. See, e.g., Herman & MacLenn 
v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683,691 (1983) ("[Tlhe antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not 
coextensive with common law doctrines!'); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723,744-45 (1975) ("[Tlhe typical fact situation in whch the classic tort of misrepresentation and 
deceit evolved was light years from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule lob-5 is 
applicable!'). For discussion of the common-law tort elements, see supra note 2. 
121. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. The courts believe that without effective 
enforcement, corporate management will not be deterred from issuing fraudulent statements. 
122. See, eg., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub norn., Price 
Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1975) 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
123. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 890, 907 (9th Cu. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
The phrase "fraud on the market" originated in Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
InHerbst plaintiffs alleged that misstatements had caused an artificial inflation in the price of the 
common stock, which induced them to convert their debentures into common stock. Slnce a deci- 
sion to convert debt into stock is based principally on the market price of the stock, in such n case 
there is direct reliance on the price in making the decision. 
124. See supra notes 7-8. 
125. Fischel, Use of Modem Finance ZZeory, supra note 5, at 5. 
126. The large-scale frauds perpetrated on the marketplace in recent years, like those in In re 
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purchase or sell stock at the prevailing market price, if he wishes to trade in 
the stock, he does not necessarily rely on the stock's price as the best available 
indicator of its value, since he can have no assurance that it accurately reflects 
the corporation's worth. hdeed, many investors purchase or sell stock be- 
cause they believe the price inaccurately reflects the corporation's worth. 
In addition to asserting the right to rely on the market price, plaintiffs also 
have argued that they have a right to rely on the integrity of the market. 
While an investor must accept all normal market rises, which include the pos- 
sibility that the market misinterpreted data, he need not accept abnormal risks 
like schemes to defraud the market. Shores reasoned that plaintfls injury was 
caused by such a scheme; had there been full and accurate disclosure the 
bonds would have been rejected by the marketplace. The presence of a fraudu- 
lent scheme, however, should not require a private damages claim for all open 
market investors. 
InArthur Young & Co. v. Unitedstates District C o ~ r t , l 2 ~  a case involving 
offerings of stock registered under the Securities Act, it was argued that the 
investor's right to rely on the market price was based on his right to rely on the 
federal regulatory process to ensure the accuracy of disclosure.128 Following 
this rationale, it can be asserted that open market investors have a similar right 
to rely on the accuracy of information disclosed in reports fled under the Ex- 
change Act. Such reliance on the regulatory process is misplaced. Even 
though the SEC has made strides toward improving the quality of disclosure, 
particularly in the Exchange Act reports, neither the agency nor the market- 
place can ensure the accuracy of these documents.129 
These "right to relyyy arguments are not persuasive substitutes for the reli- 
ance requirement. They are much more persuasive arguments when they are 
used to establish causation. The shareholder's complaint is that he was in- 
jured by manipulation of the stock price by means of misstatements, and that 
he was harmed by the market's reaction to the misstatements; that is, that he 
traded in the stock at a time when the price was tainted by inaccurate informa- 
tion. Thus, the misstatements caused the injury. Since the essence of his claim 
is manipulation of the stock price, reliance is irrelevent; rather, causation is the 
requisite element.130 This argument, however, potentially transforms every 
Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976), or SEC v. National 
Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975), attest to the ability of the marketplace 
to be misled. See Benston, Required Periodic DkcIosure Under the Securities Acfs and the Proposed 
Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1471, 1482 (1979). 
127. 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). 
128. Id. at 695. 
129. So, for example, offerors of stock under a Securities Act prospectus are required to state, 
in bold face capital type on the cover page, that the SEC has not passed upon the accuracy or 
adequacy of the prospectus. Item 501(c)(5), form S-K, 17 C.F.R. !j 229.501(~)(5) (1983). While 
improving the quality of the 1934 Act disclosures was a prerequisite for the adoption of the inte- 
grated disclosure system, see infra note 217, the SEC cannot systematically review the contents of 
most filed documents due to the large number of filings under both the Securities and Exchange 
Acts. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6190, 45 Fed. Reg. 13,438 (Feb. 29, 1980). See supra note 4. 
130. This argument is strongest in cases like Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 
374 (2d Cu. 1974), cerf. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), discussedsupra notes 56-62 and accompany- 
ing text, in which the plaintiff, a minority shareholder in a freeze-out merger, had no choice but to 
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misstatement case into a stock manipulation case. 
At common law, stock manipulation was an offense grounded on a "free 
and open market" theory: the public has a right to expect that the markets are 
free and open and reflect prices arrived at through bona fide transactions and 
not through manipulation.131 In Rex v. De Berenger,132 the earliest English 
stock manipulation case, defendants were convicted of conspiring to raise the 
price of government securities by circulating false rumors that Napoleon had 
been killed and peace was forthcoming. In such cases, in which the manipula- 
tion is effected through false statements, the offense resembles deceit. When, 
however, the manipulation is accomplished through acts such as wash sales, 
matched orders or fictitious bids, the wrong is better grounded on a "free mar- 
ket" theory. Thus, stock manipulation has roots in both deceit and "free and 
open market" the01ies.l~~ 
The conflict between the theories is apparent in cases that consider 
whether a victim of stock manipulation can sue the manipulator in the absence 
of a contractual or fiduciary relationship. An early English case held that a 
plaintiff who knew the listing requirements of an exchange, and purchased 
stock assuming that the corporation had met those standards, could recover on 
a deceit theory from defendants, who obtained the listing on the basis of false 
statements made to the exchange.134 Later cases, both in England and the 
United States, generally found that plaintiffs could not recover when there was 
no fiduciary or contractual relationship, since under the deceit theory there 
was either a lack of reliance or the injury was found to be too remote.135 
If, instead of deceit principles, the "free market" theory is applied, it can 
be argued that plaintiff has the right to expect that the prevailing market price 
has been set by actual, and not rigged, transactions. When the manipulative 
device is, for example, fictitious quotations, plaintirs injury is clear, and there 
is no need for reliance. Professor Berle extended this theory to assert that 
when a misstatement created a false valuation by the entire market and the 
buyer relied on the state of the market, he should be able to recover damages. 
This must be one of the earliest expressions of a fraud on the market theory. 136 
-- 
relinquish his shares, and therefore reliance became meaningless. In fraud on the market cases, 
however, plaintiffs do have a choice: not trading in the particular security. Cf. Madison Consul- 
tants v. FDIC, 11982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,239, at 96,041 n.6 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (presumption of reliance amounts to presumption of causation where the plaintiff di- 
rectly trades in stock in reliance on defendant's deception, since he could have declined to enter 
the transaction if he knew of fraud). 
131. Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814). 
132. Id. 
133. For discussion of the development of stock manipulation in England and the United 
States, see 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1529-40, Berle, Liabiliy for Stock Market ManipulaIion, 3 1 
COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1931); Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938); 
Moore & Wiseman, Market Manz@lation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1934); 
Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities Laws, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 65 1 (195 1); 
Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YYALE L.J. 509 (1947). 
134. Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859). The decision in Beqord 
was overruled by Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873). 
135. 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1534; Moore & Wiseman, mpfa note 133, at 65. 
136. Berle, supra note 133, at 269. See also Moore & Wiseman, supra note 133, at 65. 
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When the misstatements are accompanied by other manipulative devices 
and are clearly made with a manipulative intent, allowing the purchaser to 
recover without showing reliance, on a "free and open market" theory, is ap- 
~ r0p r i a t e . l~~  In the absence of classic manipulative devices, allowing a pur- 
chaser to recover, based on a finding of causation alone, marks a radical 
departure from rule lob-5's traditional underpinnings in deceit law. Thus, 
while seemingly attractive as a principle of law and logic, such a judicial mod- 
ification of rule lob-5 is inadvisable without some sort of legislative 
authority. 138 
111. OBJECTIONS TO THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY 
The principal objections to the fraud on the market theory are that it 
contradicts the disclosure rationale of federal securities regulation, increases 
the likelihood of complex litigation of questionable utility, and makes the po- 
tential damages claims exorbitant. Recovery is no longer compensatory; 
rather, it becomes a windfall. In addition, the heavy cost of litigation is borne 
by the corporation and necessarily affects adversely the corporation's eco- 
nomic well being, while diminishing the value of shareholders' investments. 
A. m e  Conflict Between Federal Disclomre Policy and the Fraud on the 
Market ZZeor- 
Since the principal purpose of the federal securities legislation is to pro- 
vide disclosure to enable investors to make informed decisions, opponents of 
the fraud on the market theory argue that this policy is undermined by permit- 
ting recovery by investors who have not read the disclosure documents.139 
They contend that an investor who fails to read at least some of the readily 
available public information acts recklessly and consequently should be dis- 
qualified from receiving the acts' protections.140 
137. See Second Circuit stock manipulation cases supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text. 
Some opinions have emphasized the need for a comprehensive scheme to defraud or manipulate 
the stock price, and not merely material misstatements, to establish a fraud on the market claim. 
Eg., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); 
Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 81 1,814 (2d Cir. 
1975); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770,785-86 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Green- 
span v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. 
Litig., 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (C.D. Cal. 1977). These courts are struggling to establish a special 
category of fraud on the market cases to separate these cases from run of the mill misrepresenta- 
tion cases in which plaintiffs must establish reliance. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying 
text. They have not made clear, however, how plaintiff is to establish such a scheme. The nature 
of the misstatement, the number of occasions the misstatement or a variation of it is repeated, and 
the length of time over which the misstatements are made, seem to be relevent factors. 
138. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982) (rule lob-5 
stock manipulation claim inappropriate when an explicit remedy under 5 9(e) of the Exchange 
Act is available), vacated and remanded for consideation in light of huddle st or^, 103 S. Ct. 1245 
(1983), rev'don remand, 718 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit determined that Huddle- 
sfon's "broad and unrestrictive analysis" compelled reversal of the earlier decision. For doubts on 
that view see infra notes 196-21 1. See also infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text. 
139. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,483 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 103 S.  Ct. 722 (1983). 
140. Plaintiff may be denied recovery, notwithstanding defendant's rule lob-5 violation, if 
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Rebutting this objection, critics of the federal disclosure system assert that 
there is no rational reason for a reasonable investor to read the disclosure 
documents. They argue that the required disclosure does not provide informa- 
tion useful to investment deci~ionmaking.~~~ The disclosure documents have 
become so complex and technical that an investor untrained in accounting and 
financial analysis would understand little of the contents.142 Finally, accord- 
ing to efficient-market theorists, the average investor cannot learn from the 
disclosure documents anything that would enable him to outperform the mar- 
ket, since the information contained therein has already been absorbed by the 
market and is reflected in the stock price.143 Acceptance of any of these argu- 
ments leads to the conclusion that requiring the investor to read the document 
to prosecute the claim is requiring him to engage in an unproductive task;144 
therefore, an investor cannot be acting recklessly if he disregards the disclo- 
sure documents. It follows that those who doubt the benefits of the current 
disclosure system will more readily adopt a fraud on the market theory. 
Resolution of the role of disclosure in investment decisions is outside the 
scope of this Article; nevertheless the perceived conflict between the disclosure 
policy and the fraud on the market theory is considerably reduced if the con- 
cept of reliance is expanded to include forms other than just "eyeball" reliance 
on the document i t~e1 f . l~~  Few investors actually read and understand the 
disclosure documents, but this does not mean that they do not "rely" on them 
in making their investment decisions. Their reliance is simply not a direct 
reliance. Instead, investors typically rely on their brokers or other advisers, or 
on newspaper columns and other sources that do derive their information and 
recommendations from the disclosure documents. As early as 1933, Congress 
recognized this filtering-down process when it created a remedy for misstate- 
ments in a registration statement in the Securities Act.146 It is therefore appro- 
priate, if not essential, for courts to recognize explicitly the existence of such 
forms of indirect reliance, and to acknowledge them as appropriate methods 
for investors to make their investment decisions.147 
Requiring an investor to testify about a vaguely recalled newspaper arti- 
cle or conversation with his broker may well be a waste of judicial time. When 
plaintiff failed to use "due diligence" in making his investment decision. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 
F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 91 1 (1977). 
141. Eg., Kripke, 72e Myth of the InformedLqyman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631, 631 (1973). 
142. 1 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON COW. DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, 95th CONO., 
1st SESS., 314 (Comm. Print 1977). 
143. Eg, H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 86-87 (1979);seesupra notes 7- 
8. 
144. Disclosure has also been criticized on the ground that its costs outweigh its benefits. See, 
eg., Benston, supra note 126. 
145. CJ Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 438 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("eyeball" 
reliance is required under $ 18 of the Exchange Act). 
146. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (as.) 508, 523-24 (1933). 
147. See 1 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 142, at D-9,273,290,3 12-13; Report 
of the DiscIosure Policy Sludy, DDlZosure to Investors, 52,319f (CCH 1969) ("the Wheat Report") 
(recommending an SEC rule requiring broker-dealers to read the reports before making recom- 
mendations to customers). 
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the stock is so widely traded that information about the corporation is widely 
disseminated, it may be appropriate to presume indirect r e l i an~e .1~~ 
B. Facifitating the Use of Securities Fraud Class Actions 
The fraud on the market theory developed largely for pragmatic reasons. 
Since class actions provide the only effective remedy for open market inves- 
tors, individual, subjective issues of proof must be minimized to enable use of 
the class action procedure. Thus, judicial inclination to remove obstacles from 
large-scale securities fraud litigation supplied the impetus to modify the tradi- 
tional reliance requirement.149 Consequently, plaintiffs and their attorneys 
are encouraged to institute these suits and have a basis for negotiating a 
favorable settlement. '50 
Whether encouraging class action suits in this manner is an appropriate 
policy151 depends on one's assessment of the benefits of private securities 
fraud actions. For years courts and commentators enthusiastically embraced 
the premise ofLL Case Co. v. B ~ r a k , l ~ ~  that private litigation aids in effective 
enforcement of the securities laws because private plaintiffs will prosecute vio- 
lations that would go undetected due to the SEC's limited resources. Accord- 
ingly, many courts, supported by commentators,153 have viewed the scope of 
rule lob-5 expansively and eased plaintms burdens in prosecuting ~ 1 a i m s . l ~ ~  
The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that rule lob-5 is not the 
-- 
148. Proponents of a fraud on the market theory often assert that plaintas need not prove 
reliance in nondisclosure cases and, by extension, should not be required to prove reliance in cases 
involving open market transactions because it is "impossible" to do so, and therefore such "impos- 
sibility" justifies dispensing with it. Eg., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 
88,93 (2d Cir. 1981); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234,238-39 (2d Cir. 1975); Seiffer v. 
Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653,666 (D. Kan. 1980). It certainly is not impossible for plaintiff 
to testify that if he had been told the omitted fact he would have acted differently, and such 
testimony, if credible, would establish the requisite reliance. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 
457,463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 81 1 (1965). Courts may decide that since such testimony 
is self-serving and predictable, it can be dispensed with; dispensing with the testimony, however, 
does not necessitate elimination of the element of reliance in any fraud case. Rather, the need,to 
establish direct reliance should be balanced against the waste of judicial time, according to the 
particular case. 
149. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. 
150. Even though, under the prevailing view of BZackie, defendants may raise a plaintiffs 
nonreliance defensively, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text, plaintiffs have in most 
instances won the war by obtaining class action certification, since this will virtually guarantee 
their prospects of a favorable settlement. 
151. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not intended to expand substantive law. 28 
U.S.C. 5 2872 (1976). 
152. -377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak the Court implied a private cause of action under § 14(a) 
of the Exchange Act, and provided the impetus for further suits to achieve the same end. 
lS3. see> eP Lowenfels, The Demke of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Erafor Rule lob-J, 54 VA. L. REV. 2 8 (1968). 
154. Thus, for instance, in some circuits, prior to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976), negligence was sufficient to establish defendant's liability. Eg., White v. Abrarns, 495 F.2d 
724,730 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying a "flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (holding negligence was sufficient to establish 
liability). Also, prior to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), plaintiff 
need not have been a purchaser or seller to have standing. Eg., Eason v. General Motors Accept- 
ance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). 
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broad, catch-all remedy some courts thought it to be.lS5 A principal concern 
of the Court was the particularly vexatious nature of rule lob-5 litigation that 
gave even the flimsiest case a substantial settlement value.lS6 Respected com- 
mentators have observed that since the goals of SEC and private enforcement 
differ, the latter may not be an appropriate supplement to the former, but may 
actually hamper the purposes of the securities laws.lS7 Moreover, evidence 
that a sizeable number of private suits follow upon conclusion of SEC investi- 
gations casts substantial doubt on the Borak premise.lS8 These plaintiffs do 
not ferret out previously undiscovered violations, but rather ride on the 
agency's coattails.lS9 
Even if private suits are based on violations prosecuted by the SEC, it can 
be argued that they provide a deterrent because of the in terrorem effect of 
imposing substantial liability. This argument neglects to consider that since 
ultimately the current or future shareholders "foot the bill" for plaintiffs' liti- 
gation, in the form of a reduced market value for their stock, compensating the 
plaintiffs for past injuries inevitably causes shareholders present or future 
harm. Moreover, in a fraud on the market case, a corporation held liable for 
the artificial inflation in the stock value must compensate plaintiffs even 
though the premium did not directly benefit the corporation. There is no prin- 
ciple of equitable disgorgement of profits, as exists in the insider trading cases, 
to justify plaintiffs' recovery at the expense of other shareholders in a fraud on 
the market case.160 In addition, the concern that large awards in fraud on the 
market cases become windfalls rather than compensatory recoveries is com- 
pounded by the difficulties in formulating damages and in excluding any loss 
due to factors unrelated to the misstatements. There can be little doubt that, 
in fraud on the market cases, computation of damages can be an incredibly 
complex process, with no greater assurance of reasonable accuracy.161 This, 
coupled with the fact that virtually all these cases are settled before a determi- 
nation of liability, lends support to the argument that securities fraud litiga- 
tions result in haphazard, arbitrary, and potentially ruinous recoveries. 
Early decisions recognized a reliance requirement in rule lob-5 cases, not 
only to conform the remedy to the common-law tort, but also to limit defend- 
155. See, e.8, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter requirement extends to injunctive 
actions); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (when the misconduct involves nondisclo- 
sure, defendant must have duty to disclose to be liable under rule lob-5); Sante Fe Indus. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (plaintiffmust allege a deception or misrepresentation to establish rulc 
lob-5 claim); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (defendant must have acted with 
scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff must be pur- 
chaser or seller to have standing in lob-5 claim). Two issues that remain open are: recklessness as 
establishing scienter, see supra note 2, and aider and abetter liability. Herman & MacLem v. 
Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 685 n.4 (1983). 
156. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975). 
157. See, e.8, Frankel, Implied Righs ofAction, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 570 (1981). 
158. See Dooley, Enforcement of Imider Trading Resfrictiom, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1980). 
159. See Frankel, supra note 157, at 579. 
160. See, e.8, SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983); Elkind v. Liggett &Myers, Inc., 
635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Randolph, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
ICCW I[ 99,170 (N.D. Calif. 1983). 
, "  . 
' 161. See sup= note 30. 
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ants' potential liability.162 It is ironic that the first recognition of the danger of 
providing "investors' insurance7' against bad investments was in cases involv- 
ing negotiated transaction~l~~ and that the reliance requirement is most rigor- 
ously adhered to today in these cases.164 In the open market cases, however, 
in which commentators have recognized the serious problem of staggering cor- 
porate liability,165 many courts have largely dispensed with a reliance require- 
ment in the name of protecting the open market investor. 
The insider trading cases have presented most dramatically the specter of 
"Draconian liability."l66 It was the inability to limit the damage recovery that 
led the Sixth Circuit, in Fridrich v. Bradford,167 to find that defendants caused 
no injury to plaintiffs.16* In Elkind v. Llgget & Meyers, Inc. 169 the Second 
Circuit attempted to solve the problem, not by refusing to find liability, but by 
limiting plaintiffs' recovery to the disgorgement of defendants7 gains.170 The 
First Circuit, in SEC v. MacDonald,171 went further, and held that the meas- 
ure of disgorgement was limited to accretions in stock value occurring up to a 
reasonable time after other investors received the information. Significantly, 
the court felt it necessary to exclude gains not causally related to the fraud 
even when the SEC brought the suit. These cases illustrate the judicial percep- 
tion that "Draconian liability" is a serious issue when the traditional tort-law 
elements are relaxed. 
In conclusion, while the fraud on the market theory presents an attractive 
approach to providing protection for open market investors, it nonetheless 
raises serious doubts about whether it is an appropriate judicial expansion of 
rule lob-5 law. In cases in which indirect reliance cannot appropriately be 
presumed, the theory conflicts with federal disclosure policy; even in cases in- 
volving widely-traded securities, in which a presumption of indirect reliance is 
appropriate , the theory adds to the existing difficulties plaguing the typical 
large-scale federal securities litigation involving huge damages claims. 
162. Eg., List V. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. detxied 382 U.S. 811 
(1965). 
163. Eg., i d ;  Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). 
164. Courts are more likely to retain the requirement of reliance in some form in a privately 
negotiated transaction, because of the resemblance to the common law tort of deceit. Dooley, m e  
Efects o Civil Liabilify on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776, 
819 n.2 d 3 (1972). Other early commentators posited reliance as a requirement for negotiated 
transactions, but not for open market transactions. Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liabifip 
under Rule IOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1151. 
165. See, e.g., Cox, Ernst & Emst v. Hochfelder: A Critique & an Evaluation of itsImpact upon 
the Scheme of the Federal Securities Lows, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977); Dooley, supra note 164; 
Frankel, supra note 157. 
166. Eg., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,242 (2d Cir. 
1974). 
167. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). 
168. Id at 320-21. The Sixth Circuit did, however, leave open the question of liability when 
defendants' trading affected the market price. Id at 320 11.27. 
169. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). 
170. Id at 173. 
171. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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IV. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY AND THE EXPLICIT REMEDIES 
Another objection to the fraud on the market theory is that it conflicts 
with the Supreme Court's efforts to harmonize the implied remedy under rule 
lob-5 with the explicit remedies under the federal securities laws. Specifically, 
rule lob-5, with its elimination or relaxation of the reliance element, conflicts 
with section 18 of the Exchange Act, which requires direct reliance. 
In Herman & MacLean v. HuddZesfon 172 the Supreme Court held that the 
plaintifPs potential section 11 claim173 under the Securities Act did not pre- 
clude recovery under rule lob-5 of the Exchange Act. While recognizing the 
overlap of section 11 and rule lob-5 and, in general, the appropriateness of 
cumulative remedies, the Court's opinion does not mandate cumulative reme- 
dies in all instances.174 Instead, the implied remedy must be harmonized with 
the explicit remedies.I75 In addition, in Ernsf & Ernsf v. HochfeZder176 the 
Supreme Court declined to extend rule lob-5 liability to negligent misstate- 
ments because it would "nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn proce- 
dural  restriction^"'^^ of section 11. Therefore, the role of reliance and 
causation in the explicit remedy provisions must be examined in order to de- 
termine their appropriate role in rule lob-5 claims, since the Court would re- 
fuse to dispense with a reliance requirement in rule lob-5 if it conflicted with 
the congressionally designed statutory scheme.178 
Section 11 of the Securities permits anyone who acquires a security 
issued under a registration statement to sue the issuer and certain other speci- 
fied defendants for material misstatements in the registration statement. 
There is no requirement that plaintiff demonstrate any reliance on the registra- 
tion statement unless he acquires the security after the issuer releases an earn- 
ings statement covering a twelve-month period beginning after the effective 
172. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). 
173. The court of appeals noted that plaintiffs "apparently did have a Section 11 remedy," 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 640 F.2d 534, 541 n.5 (1981), although the Supreme Court 
indicated that this conclusion may be open with respect to the accounting firm, 103 S. Ct. at 687 
n.11. A commentator has suggested that the § 11 claim was apparently time-barred. Siegal, The 
Interplay Between the Implied Remedy under Section 10(4 and the Express Causes of Action of the 
Federal Securities Laws, 62 B.U.L. REV. 385,391 (1982). 
174. In Huddleston cumulative remedies under $ 11 and rule lob-5 were accepted because 
"the two provisions involve distinct causes of action and were intended to address d~fferent ypes 
of wrongdoing." 103 S. Ct. at 687. Section 11 was "designed to assure compliance with the 
disclosure provisions of the Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who 
play a direct role in a registered offering," i d ,  and thus imposes liability for any matenal misstate- 
ment in the registration statement. Rule lob-5, on the other hand, is a "catchall" antifraud provi- 
sion requiring scienter. Id 
175. InHuddlesfon the Court determined that exempting fraudulent misstatements in registra- 
tion statements from rule lob-5 liability would "conflict with the basic purpose of the 1933 Act: to 
provide greater protection to purchasers of registered securities!' Id at 688. 
176. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
177. Id at 210. 
178. A threshold question is whether there is, in fact, a coherent statutory scheme with respect 
to the explicit remedies, since a significant distinction between the two Acts is apparent. The 
remedies for material misstatements under the Securities Act substantially ease plaintiffs burden 
of proving causation and reliance; the remedy for material misstatements under the Exchange Act 
requires plaintiff to prove both reliance and causation. 
179. 15 U.S.C. 77k (1976). 
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date of the registration statement.lsO Even when reliance is required, it may 
be established by means other than showing that the plaintiff actually read the 
document.181 Moreover, plaintiff need not prove that the price of the stock 
was artificially inflated by reason of the misstatement;lS2 rather, it is defend- 
ant's burden to show that the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff resulted 
from factors other than the misstatement.lS3 
Section 12(2) of the Securities ActlS4 permits a purchaser of a security to 
sue the offeror or seller for misstatements made either orally or in a prospec- 
t ~ s . ~ ~ ~  There is no requirement that the plaintiff establish reliance or that the 
misstatement cause his injury.lS6 
In contrast, section 18 of the Exchange Act permits a purchaser or seller 
of a security to sue for misstatements contained in reports fYed under the Ex- 
change Act, but only when he can show that he relied directly on the statement 
and that the stock price was affected by the statement.lS7 Thus, the plaintiff 
must show both reliance and causation to establish a section 18 violation. 
Finally, section 9(e) of the Exchange Act provides that an investor who 
trades in a security registered on a national securities exchange, at a price af- 
fected by certain forms of stock manipulation, may sue for damages anyone 
who willfully participates in the proscribed act.1s8 There is no requirement of 
reliance, but plaintzs burden of establishing causation is onerous. It has 
been described as "double-barreled"; he must show that he bought or sold at a 
price affected by the manipulation, and his recovery is limited to damages 
sustained as a result of the manipulat i~n. '~~ 
In enacting the Securities Act, Congress recognized that many investors 
would not be able to understand much of the contents of the registration state- 
ment and would necessarily rely on other sources of information. The infor- 
mation in the registration statement would affect most investors by its effect on 
180. Id 5 77k(a). 
181. Id 
182. Plaintiffs who sue under 5 1 l(a) may recover the difference between the amount paid for 
the security (not to exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public) and (1) the 
value of the security on the date the suit was brought, or (2) the price at which the security was 
sold, if sold before the suit, or (3) the price at which the security was sold, if sold before judgment, 
if greater than the value on the date suit was brought. An underwriter is not liable for damages in 
excess of the total offering price of the securities underwritten by it. In no event shall the amount 
recoverable exceed the total offering price. Id 5 77k(e). 
183. 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(e) (1976). For application of this "negative causation" defense, see Feit 
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544,548 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
184. 15 U.S.C. 5 771(2) (1976). 
185. Unlike 5 11, 5 12(2) liability extends to the sale of unregistered securities. Section 12(2), 
however, requires privity between plaintiff and defendant, and thus is not designed as a remedy 
for fraud on the market. But see Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980) (seller liability 
extends beyond strict privity; test of proximate cause used). 
186. Section 12(2) provides plaintiff shall recover the price paid upon tender of the security or 
for damages if he no longer owns the security. Presumably this would be measured by the 
purchase price of the stock less the proceeds of the sale, with no allowance for the "negative 
causation" defense authorized in § 1 l(e). 
187. 15 U.S.C. 3 78r (1976). 
188. Id at 5 78i(e). 
189. 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1750-51. 
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the stock price.lgO Therefore, Congress determined that generally purchasers 
of the securities need not establish reliance on the registration statement and 
need never demonstrate that they had read the registration statement. 
Since Congress in 1933 clearly understood the average investor's depen- 
dence on professional sources for making investment decisions, one looks to 
determine the reasons Congress, in 1934, required plaintiffs to establish both 
reliance and causation to state a claim under section 18 of the Exchange Act. 
Legislative history provides a clear answer. As originally drafted, the provi- 
sion did not contain a requirement of reliance; opposition to the Exchange 
Act, led principally by the stock exchanges, resulted in the provision's revision 
to its current form.lgl 
190. Thus, William 0. Douglas noted that: 
[Elven though an investor has neither the time, money, nor intelligence to assimilate the 
mass of information in the registration statement, there will be those who can and who 
will do so, whenever there is a broad market. The judgment of those experts will be 
reflected in the price market. Through them investors who seek advice wlll be able to 
obtain it. And so during the early months of the life of a security the registration state- 
ment will serve as a healthy conditioner of the market. . . . The common law with its 
insistence upon the presence of an intent on the part of the seller to defraud, of a causal 
relation between the misstatement and the damage, and of a reliance by the buyer on the 
misstatement, presented almost insuperable procedural barriers to recovery. 
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (n.s.) 521, 524 (1933). 
See also Douglas & Bates, m e  Federal Securities Act of 193.3,43 YALE L.J. 171, 176 (1933) 
(During the early life of a security "the registration statement will be an important conditioner of 
the market." If plaintiff buys in the open market "he may be as much affected by misstatements as 
if he had read and understood the statement."). 
191. Identical bills, which led eventually to the final legislation, were introduced by Senator 
Fletcher on February 9, 1934, S. 2693,73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and by Representative Rayburn 
on February 10, 1934, H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). What was then $ 17(a) read as 
follows: 
Any person who shall make or any person, including any director, officer, accountant, or 
other agent of such person, who shall be responsible for the making of any statement in 
any application, report, or document filed with the Commission, which statement is, in 
the light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading in respect of 
any matter sufficiently important to influence the judgment of an average investor shall 
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who 
shall have purchased or sold a security the price of which may have been affected by 
such statement, and the person injured may sue in law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction for the damages caused by such statement, unless the person sued 
shall sustain the burden of proof that he acted in good faith and in the exercise of reason- 
able care had no ground to believe that such statement was false or misleading. 
During the hearings on the bii, representatives of the stock exchanges, in particular, voiced 
strong objections to $ 17 on several grounds, one of which was the absence of a requirement of 
reliance. This was part of the stock exchanges' campaign against imposition of reporting require- 
ments on listed corporations. Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, 
stated that: 
[Tlhe really objectionable feature of this provisibn is that the civil penalties may be re- 
covered by persons who have not relied upon the inaccurate or misleading state- 
ment. . . . If any civil penalties are deemed necessary, then they should be limited to 
the actual damages suffered by persons who have been misled by the false or inaccurate 
statement. 
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.), S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 57 Be/ore the 
Senate Banking Comm, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6638 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Practices Hearings]; 
see also Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R 7852 & H.R 8720 Before the House Inter- 
stare & Foreiign Commerce Comm, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1934) (statement of Richard Whitney, 
Pres. of the N.Y.S.E. [hereinafter cited as Regulation Hearings]; Practices Hearings, mpa, Comm. 
Exhibit No. 111, at 7285 (statement of Richard Whitney on $ 17). Others asserted that the provi- 
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In light of its background, section 18 appears to be a classic product of 
political compromise. Realizing that all traders would be injured by a mis- 
statement,lg2 Congress, to assure passage of the legislation, nevertheless gave 
only a small segment of investors a remedy. 
The closest analogue in the explicit remedies to rule lob-5's implied rem- 
edy of fraud on the market is section 18,1g3 which requires direct reliance1g4 
on filed documents.lg5 The presence of this requirement in section 18 raises 
serious questions about allowing less than direct reliance as a basis for the 
sion would encourage "blackmail," PracticesHearings, supra, at 6939 (statement of Mr. Bernheim, 
Dir., Securities Markets Survey of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.); id at 6993 (statement of 
Mr. Thompson, Pres., Ass'n of Stock Exchanges); Regulation Hearings, supra, at 262 (statement of 
Mr. Thompson), would serve to protect speculators from their bad investments, Practices Hear- 
ings, supra, at 6914-15 (statement of Mr. Hope, Pres., Ass'n of Stock Exchange Firms); Regulaion 
Hearings, supra, at 307 (statement by Mr. Hope), and was a "hold-up," Practices Hearings, supra, 
at 7267 (statement of Mr. Blumenthal, Chairman, Sidney Blumenthal & Co., Inc.). 
The b i  were revised prior to debate in the House and Senate. The revised versions of the 
Senate and House b i  varied somewhat in language. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 9323 (1934) (5 17(a)); and S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. 
REC. 3420 (1934) (§ 18(a)). Both, however, now stated that liability runs to any person not know- 
ing that such statement was false or misleading who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have 
purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused 
by such reliance. In House debate, Representative Rayburn explained that the change had been 
made in response to the expressed opposition. 
The first provision of the b i  as originally written was very much challenged on the 
ground that reliance should be required. This objection has been met. In other words, if 
a man bought a security following a prospectus that carried a false or misleading state- 
ment, he could not recover from the man who sold to him, nor could the seller be pun- 
ished criminally, unless the buyer bought the security with knowledge of the statement 
and relied upon the statement. It seemed to m thal this is ar little ar we could do. 
78 CONG. REC. 7700-01 (1934) (emphasis added); seealso Rayburn's response to Hollister's objec- 
tions to 5 17(a), id at 8039 (1934). At another point, Rayburn noted that the civil liability provi- 
sions in the Securities Act went further than this provision. See id at 8040 (1934); see also S. Doc. 
No. 185, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 10,186 (1934). 
While differences between the Senate and the House versions remained to be ironed out in 
conference, the language regarding reliance was not changed. H.R. Rep. No. 1838,73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 36 (1934) (Conference Report to accompany H.R. 9323). 
192. For reactions of commentators at the time of its passage, see Tracey & MacChesney, The 
Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1058 (1934); Comment, CivilLia6ility for 
Misstatements in Documents Piled Under Securities Acf and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J. 
456,461 (1935). For a later critical view of 18, see Knauss,A Reapprabal ofthe Role of Dclo-  
sure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 627 (1964). 
193. Section 9(e) provides a private remedy for certain forms of stock manipulation, ie., will- 
ful participation in an act or transaction prohibited under subsections (a), @) or (c) of § 9. Section 
9(a)(4) could give rise to a fraud on the market claim, since the gravamen is making misstatements 
for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of the security. The defendant, however, must be 
a person selling, offering to sell, purchasing or offering to purchase said security, so if the corpora- 
tion were not in the market, the section would not be applicable. When applicable, there would be 
issues concerning what is required to establish the requisite purpose. 
194. Moreover, courts have interpreted the reliance requirement in 18, 15 U.S.C. 78r 
(1976), strictly as "eyeball" reliance on the document. Eg., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 
1968). cert. denied 395 U.S. 903 f1969k Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth. 11981 Transfer 
~indGr] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V $S,~~~(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17,1981); Wachovia B86k &Trust Co. 
v. National Student Mktn. Corn., 650 F.2d 342 D.C. Ci. 1980). cert. denied. 445 U.S. 954 (1981). 
195. Section 18,15 U ~ C .  78r (1976), provides liability formaterial misstatements coniaineh 
in any document filed pursuant to the Securities or Exchange Acts, or the rules and regulations 
thereunder. Section 13,15 U.S.C. 5 78m (1976), requires the liling of certain documents, e.g, the 
reports on forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K, for issuers of securities registered under 5 12. In general, 
annual reports to shareholders are not deemed to be "filed" with the SEC and are therefore not 
subject to the liabilities of 18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1983). 
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implied remedy. In Huddleston lg6 the Supreme Court accepted the cumula- 
tive remedies of section 11 and rule lob-5, because it found that "the two 
provisions involve distinct causes of action and were intended to address dif- 
ferent types of wrongdoing."lg7 When the rule lob-5 remedy closely resem- 
bles the express remedy in section 18 and addresses the same type of 
wrongdoing, HuddZeston 's justification for cumulative remedies fails. Even so, 
permitting cumulative remedies works no harm if it means mere duplication. 
If the implied remedy relaxes a requirement of the explicit remedy, however, 
an unacceptable nullification of the congressional scheme results. Accord- 
ingly, the Supreme Court inHochfeZderlg8 sought to avoid nullification of sec- 
tion 11 and its procedural restrictions by interpreting rule lob-5 to require 
scienter. Following the same reasoning, it would be inappropriate to imply a 
remedy under rule lob-5 that expanded an express remedy, by eliminating an 
element required to make out the express claim. To permit this would nullify 
the express remedy and allow improper judicial intervention in the statutory 
scheme. 
The forerunner of the cumulative remedies approach is the Second Cir- 
cuit's decision in Fiischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co. ,I99 which the Su- 
preme Court cited with approval in Hudd(esfon.200 Both preferred and 
common stockholders brought suit alleging misstatements in a registration 
statement fled under the Securities Act with respect to the preferred stock. 
While only the preferred stockholders had a remedy under section 11 of the 
Securities Act, the court held that the common stockholders could bring a rule 
lob-5 claim. It reasoned that plaintiffs who met the requirements for suing 
under section 11201 established a prima facie case by showing that the docu- 
ment contained material misstatements. To avoid liability, the individual de- 
fendants must prove that they exercised due diligence.202 Plaintiffs who did 
not satisfy the requirements of section 11 must establish not only the material 
misstatements, but also the defendant's fraudulent inter1t.~03 Thus, the court 
reasoned, rule lob-5 is available for "all who are the victims of the frauP2" 
whether or not they could bring suit under section 11. Courts subsequently 
extended Rschman's rationale to allow rule lob-5 claims to be brought not 
only by plaintiffs who never could have sued under section 11, but also by 
plaintiffs who theoretically might have had a section 11 claim, but had not 
196. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). 
197. Id at 687. 
198. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
199. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). 
200. 103 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1983). 
201. Plaintiff must be a purchaser of the securities issued under the registration statement; he 
must bring suit within the statute of limitations prescribed under 5 13 (generally of shorter dura- 
tion than the state's fraud statutes of limitations applicable under rule lob-5); and the court may 
require him to post security for costs, 5 1 l(e), 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(e) (1976). 
202. Section ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(b)(3) (1976). 
203. The Second Circuit in Fkchman correctly anticipated the holding of Ernst & Ernst V. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
204. Fkchman, 188 F.2d at 786. 
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brought it.205 Huddleston confirmed this cumulative remedies approach. 
The Second Circuit, in Ross v. A.H Robins Co. ,206 applied I;ischman's 
logic and held that a rule lob-5 claim could be based on misstatements con- 
tained in a document filed under the Exchange Act, notwithstanding the sec- 
tion 18 remedy. It noted "substantial differences in the burden facing the 
plaintiff under the two statutes."207 Under rule lob-5, the plaintiff must prove 
scienter, while under section 18 the defendant must prove he acted in good 
faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false and misleading. On 
the other hand, section 18 required direct, "eyeball" reliance on the document, 
while rule lob-5, according to the court, permitted indirect reliance. In the 
view of the court, the higher standard of proof imposed on the plaintiff under 
rule lob-5 provided the rationale both for justi-g the availability of the rule 
lob-5 remedy, notwithstanding the existence of section 18, and for relaxing 
section 18's direct reliance requirement under rule 10b-5.208 
The analysis in Robins is suspect, given the rationale of H u d d l e ~ f o n . ~ ~ ~  
An examination of section 18(a) and rule lob-5 leads to the conclusion that the 
provisions do nor "address different types of wrongdoing."210 Rather, they 
both are concerned with fraudulent misstatements, regardless of the shift in 
the burden of proof. Moreover, in earlier opinions, the Supreme Court sug- 
gested that section 18 was the exclusive remedy for misstatements in filed 
documents.21 
On the other hand, the broad language of Huddlesfon and its emphasis 
that rule lob-5 fraud is light-years away from the common-law deceit rem- 
edy,212 indicate that the Court will not be inhibited by the explicit remedies in 
fashioning the reliance and causation elements under rule lob-5. In addition, 
- 
205. See also Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 
@.C. Cir. 1980), cerf. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981), in which the District of Columbia Circuit, 
relying upon Fischman, held that purchasers of stock in a private placement were not limited to a 
remedy under 5 12(2) of the Securities Act, but could bring a rule lob-5 claim. See also Berger v. 
Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d 302 (8th Cu. 1982); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th 
Cir. 1975), cerf. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); In re 
New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
206. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cu. 1979), cerf. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). 
207. Id at 555. 
208. Id at 556. A.H. Robim Co. is criticized in Siegel, supra note 173. In contrast to A.U. 
Robins Co., in Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated 
andremanded for consideration in /@hf of UuddIesfon, 103 S. Ct. 1254 (1983), rev'don remand, 71 8 
F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983). this nullification approach was held to bar an implied remedy under rule 
lob-5 when a claim was not made out under 5 9(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. $78i(e) (1976). 
The Chemefron court reasoned that since 5 9(a)(4)'s scienter, causation, and reliance requirements 
are more stringent than those of rule lob-5, allowing the implied remedy would nullify the express 
remedy. Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1162. On remand, however, the court concluded that, after Hud- 
dlesfon, a claim that contained all the elements of a rule lob-5 offense should not be barred 
because of an express statutory remedy. 
209. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). 
210. Id at 687. 
211. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
212. 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1983) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723,744-45 (1975)). 
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Ross v. A H :  Robbins Co. is cited i nHudde~s fon ,~~~  although in the context it 
would be straining to read its citation as necessarily approving the result. 
Liability is imposed under section 18 only with respect to misstatements 
in filed documents,214 and, notwithstanding Robins, section 18 is best viewed 
as the exclusive remedy. Most misstatements found in filed documents, how- 
ever, are also contained in unfiled documents. Accordingly, the question be- 
comes whether liability for misstatements in unfiled documents can be 
grounded under rule lob-5 if such misstatements are also found in filed docu- 
ments. The answer to this question must certainly be yes. Since SEC v. Texas 
&ySu@hur,215 courts have imposed liability without regard to whether mis- 
statements are also found in filed documents. The question then becomes, 
since direct reliance is required for imposing liability for misstatements in filed 
documents under section 18, must such reliance be required for imposing lia- 
bility for misstatements in unfiled documents under rule lob-5. To answer 
this question negatively is not to "nullify" section 18, although its scope be- 
comes very narrow. By this approach section 18 becomes a remedy of last 
resort, applicable only when the misstatement was contained in no document 
other than a filed one and only when the investor actually read the document. 
This is not inconsistent with congressional intent. 
V. INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE--THE SEC'S RECOGNITION OF THE 
EFFICIENT-MARKET THESIS 
Proponents of the fraud on the market theory rely on the efficient-market 
thesis to justify the theory's extended use in securities fraud cases. The SEC 
explicitly recognized the efficient market thesis in 1982 by its adoption of an 
integrated disclosure system. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the inte- 
grated disclosure system in determining the extent of the SECYs acceptance of 
the efficient-market thesis to the fraud on the market theory, and its applica- 
tion. When the SEC has determined that information about a corporation is 
sufficiently widely disseminated that it need not be directly provided to the 
purchaser in the prospectus, the courts should likewise appropriately presume 
indirect reliance on the information by open market investors in fraud on the 
market cases.216 
The integrated disclosure system marked the culmination of the SEC's 
efforts to effect a major policy reversal: to deemphasize the Securities Act's 
disclosure system which mandates delivery of a prospectus to the investor 
213. Id at 689 n.21. 
214. See supra note 195. 
215. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Contra McKee v. Federal's 
Inc., 11979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,958 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 1979) (when 
allegedly fraudulent misstatements were contained in both form 10-K and the annual report, a 
rule lob-5 action could not be brought). 
216. While most of the fraud on the market cases involve securities purchased in trading trans- 
actions, with disclosure requirements regulated by the Exchange Act, the integrated disclosure 
system prescribes prospectus disclosure requirements for securities offerings registered under the 
Securities Act. Since the integrated disclosure system assumes an equivalency of materiality of 
information under the two acts, this distinction should be irrelevant. 
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upon the distribution of securities, and to emphasize the Exchange Act's dis- 
closure system which mandates periodic filing of disclosure documents.217 
Three levels of registrants are created. Corporations whose stocks are actively 
traded and widely followed in the marketplace may use form S-3. These regis- 
trants comprise the first The second level of registrants, those that 
have been subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act for at 
least three years, may use form S-2. Finally, all other issuers must use form S- 
1. 
The quantity of information required in the prospectus depends on which 
form the issuer is permitted to use. The SEC's creation of a "top tier" of issu- 
ers that need disseminate only a bare-bones prospectus (form S-3) is based on 
the efficient-market thesis. In incorpbrating this theory, the SEC assumes that, 
in the case of the most widely traded securities, information on the issuer is 
widely available,219 there is some assurance that it is accurate,220 and there- 
fore it need not be directly supplied to the investor. In these instances, the 
prospectus need contain only new information, or information that brings up- 
to-date previously filed information, about the issuer, as well as information 
relating specifically to the offering. All other information traditionally con- 
tained in a prospectus is not set forth in the form S-3 prospectus, but is incor- 
porated by reference to the Exchange Act documents.221 In contrast, an issuer 
eligible to use form S-2 must either deliver to the investor copies of the rele- 
vant Exchange Act reports or reprint the information in the prospectus. Form 
S-1 users must prepare a detailed disclosure document. 
To be eligible to use form S-3, the issuer must have been subject to the 
Exchange Act reporting requirements for at least thirty-six months; it must 
217. The premise of the integrated disclosure system--that the periodic disclosure require- 
ments of the Exchange Act play a more significant role in the disclosure scheme than the transac- 
tional disclosure requirements of the Securities Act-was first developed in Cohen, "Tnrth in 
Senrritia"RevIj.ite4 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966). For background on the integrated disclosure 
system, see Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6331, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 41,902 (1981); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980). 
218. 17 C.F.R. $239.1 1 (1983). 
219. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980). 
220. The efficient-market theory draws no distinctions between accurate and inaccurate infor- 
mation. See supra notes 7-8. The SEC views the filing of the reports with the SEC, with at least 
the potential for SEC review, and the liabilities for misstatements, as a curb on both intentional 
and unintentional misstatements by management. The upgrading of the quality of the Exchange 
Act documents is an essential aspect of the integrated disclosure system. See genera?@ Sec. Act 
Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982). 
221. The technique of incorporation by reference subjects the issuer to liability under $ 11 of 
the Securities Act for material misstatements in the registration statement, see q r a  notes 179-83 
and accompanying text, even though the misstatements are contained in the Exchange Act reports 
and are not reproduced in the prospectus received by the investor. Underwriters participating in a 
securities offering pursuant to form S-3 thus are liable for misstatements in the Exchange Act 
reports, even though they did not participate in their preparation, unless they can establish the 
"due diligence" defense of $ 11@)(3). 15 U.S.C. $77k@)(3) (1982). Rule 176, 17 C.F.R. 
$ 230.176 (1983), identifies certain of the circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of the 
investigation and the determination of what constitutes reasonable ground for belief under 
$ 11@)(3), 15 U.S.C. $77k@)(3) (1982). See also Rule 412, 17 C.F.R. $230.412 (1983). For criti- 
cism of the SEC's aDDr0ach of ''incornration bv reference." see Pickholz & Horahan. Z%e SEC3 
Versin ofthe ~flcjei t  Market m e 0 6  and Its impact on ~ecurztia Lzw Liabilities, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 943 (1982). 
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have fled all required reports during that period; and it must have timely filed 
all reports for the past twelve months.222 There are certain disqualifying 
events.223 Moreover, in the SEC's view, subjecting a stock to the continuous 
disclosure requirements for three years gives no assurance that it is sufficiently 
followed by the financial analysts to warrant application of the efficient-mar- 
ket thesis, and thus trigger eligibility for form S-3.224 TO ensure that form S-3 
is available only to such widely traded securities, the SEC imposes certain 
"transaction" requirements. The most significant one, in primary offerings for 
cash, is a "float" requirement of $150 million or, alternatively, a float of $100 
million and an annual trading volume of three million shares.225 When the 
primary offering for cash is of "investment grade"226 nonconvertible debt and 
preferred securities, there is no float or trading volume requirement. In these 
offerings the SEC determined that investment decisions are made principally 
on the basis of interest rates and security ratings and not on the basis of spe- 
cific information about the issuer.227 Moreover, any secondary offering228 of a 
qualilied issuer's stock may use form S-3 as long as the securities are listed on 
a national securities exchange or quoted in NASDAQ, because the SEC "con- 
cluded that most secondary offerings are more in the nature of ordinary mar- 
ket transactions than primary offerings by the registrant, and thus, that 
Exchange Act reports may be relied upon to provide the marketplace the in- 
formation needed respecting the registrant."229 
Reviewing the SEC's three releases on integrated disclosure, one sees a 
tightening in the criteria for form S-3 eligibility from those first proposed, 
222. In addition, the issuer must be domestically organized with its principal business opera- 
tions in the United States or its territories, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(a)(l) (1983), or a foreign private 
issuer that files the same reports with the SEC under 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(d) (1982), as does a domestic issuer, 17 C.F.R. 239.13(a)(5) (1983). 
223. The following acts disqualify the issuer from using form S-3: If the issuer or its subsidi- 
ary, since the end of the last hcal year for which certified financial statements have been filed, 
f d e d  to pay a dividend or sinking fund installment on preferred stock; or defaulted on any in- 
stallment on indebtedness for borrowed money; or defaulted on any rental on one or more long 
term leases, which defaults in the aggregate are material to the issuer's financial position. While 
the SEC abandoned proposals to coordinate form S-3 eligibility to an assessment of the quality of 
the issuer, it was nevertheless concerned that until release of the audited financial statements, 
information about these developments might not be widely known. Therefore, it will not allow 
corporations that would otherwise be eligible for form S-3 to avail themselves of the benefits 
provided by recognition of the efficient-market theory. 
224. Contrast the approach of the ALI's FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE 202 (113); 505(a) 
(1980), in which a distinction is drawn between registrants that have been subject to the reporting 
requirements for one year and those that have not. 
225. "Float" is defined as the aggregate market value of the voting stock held by non-affiliates 
of the registrant. See 17 C.F.R. 239.13@)(1) (1983). An "affiliate" is a person that controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with, the registrant. 17 C.F.R. 230.405 (1983). 
226. "Investment grade securities" are defined at 17 C.F.R. 239.13@)(2) (1983); typically, 
they are those rated within the four highest categories by at least two of the nationally recognized 
statistical rating organizations. See 17 C.F.R. 240.15~3-l(c)(2)(vi)o(l) (1983). 
227. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383,47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982). Other transactions eligible for use of 
form S-3 by qualified issuers are certain rights offerings or offerings related to dividend or interest 
reinvestment plans, conversions, and warrants. 17 C.F.R. 239.13@)(4) (1983). 
228. A secondary offering is one in which the seller of the securities is not the issuer. See 17 
C.F.R. Q 239.13@)(1), (3) (1983). 
229. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982). 
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which were basically those of former S-16.230 Apparently, the SEC became 
convinced that the market is not so efficient as had been popularly supposed, 
and that form S-16 availability included many securities not widely followed. 
In addition, the SEC initially proposed that secondary offerings would be sub- 
ject to the same float criteria as primary offerings. Only after many commen- 
tators noted the hardships that would occur as a result, particularly for 
secondary offerings previously eligible under form S-16,231 did the SEC relax 
the requirements for secondary offerings. 
The integrated disclosure system thus supports B l a ~ k i e ' s ~ ~ ~  rebuttable 
presumption of indirect reliance with respect to the top tier of issuers, those 
meeting the issuer eligibility requirements of form S-3 and one of the alterna- 
tive float requirements. In addition, when the securities offered are investment 
grade, nonconvertible senior securities, a court may apply the BIackie pre- 
sumption consistent with the premise underlying the integrated disclosure 
system. 
It can be argued that the Blackie presumption should be extended to in- 
clude all issuers that meet the registrant eligibility requirements and that have 
securities listed on a national securities exchange or NASDAQ. This ap- 
proach is consistent with the SEC's justification for relaxing the requirements 
for secondary offerings since they are more like trading transactions.233 The 
SEC's distinction between primary and secondary offerings, however, is incon- 
sistent with the underlying premise of the integrated disclosure system-that 
materiality is equivalent for purposes of both Acts-and apparently was moti- 
vated by pragmatic  consideration^.^^^ 
If the securities involved in a fraud on the market case do not meet the 
criteria of form S-3, the court should not grant plaintiffs the Blackie presump- 
tion of reliance. This refusal is consistent with the SEC's determination that 
market information is not sufficiently widely disseminated to assume the mar- 
ket's general familiarity with it. The requirement of reliance could be satis- 
fied, however, in a number of ways other than eyeball reliance: discussions 
with a broker or investment adviser or information from an investment col- 
umn.235 Such a showing of indirect reliance is appropriate for issuers falling 
in the second tier-basically 3-year registrants with securities listed on an ex- 
change or traded through NASDAQ. Corporations in this category have an 
established background and are followed by financial analysts and the press. 
An investor might appropriately make an investment decision by consulting 
these available sources. 
If the fraud on the market case involved securities of an issuer that must 
230. Form S-16, 17 C.F.R. 5 239.27 (1983), permitted the use of short form registration state- 
ments for secondary offerings. See Sec. Act Rel. No. 5117, 36 Fed. Reg. 777 (1970). 
231. Compare Sec. Act Rel. No. 6331,46 Fed. Reg. 41,902 (1981), with Sec. Act Rel. No. 6393, 
47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982). 
232. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 890 (9th Ci. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
233. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982). 
234. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. 
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use form S-1, the court should examine more closely the basis of plaintifs 
investment decision. If plaintiff traded in stock of unseasoned h s  or other 
speculative securities, the court should require a more direct form of reliance, 
perhaps including the perusal of corporate reports, to permit recovery under 
rule lob-5. Without a showing of direct reliance, plaintiffs claim should be 
dismissed because such investor acted recklessly in failing to consult available 
i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  His claim should be barred under rule lob-5, so that the fed- 
eral disclosure policy is not undermined.237 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fraud on the market theory was born out of judicial desire to provide 
an effective remedy for open market investors defrauded by misstatements and 
in particular to accommodate the rule lob-5 remedy to the class action device. 
Its development, moreover, was furthered by the growing acceptance of the 
efficient-market theory, which calls into question the value of the average in- 
vestor's direct, individual reliance on disclosure documents. Thus, fraud on 
the market reworks the traditional elements of a rule lob-5 claim-material- 
ity, reliance, and causation-to reflect the realities of open-market trading. 
Fraud on the market has not yet developed into a coherent theory. In all 
its forms, the role of reliance is reduced by the emphasis on materiality and 
causation. In its most extreme form, a finding of materiality results in the 
conclusion that the violation caused the investor's injury: reliance is effec- 
tively eliminated as an element. Under this pure causation approach, every 
action for misstatement is transformed into a stock manipulation claim. This 
pure causation form of the fraud on the market theory is persuasive when the 
securities are traded in an efficient market, for if the misstatement has an im- 
pact in determining the stock price, necessarily every trader in that stock is 
affected by the misstatement and suffers injury as a result of it. When, on the 
other hand, the securities are not so widely traded that their market can be 
considered efficient, there is no basis for assuming that the information had an 
impact on the price that affects all investors. Completely eliminating the re- 
quirement of reliance, however, would mark a radical departure from rule 
lob-5's traditional underpinnings and should not be undertaken by the judici- 
ary. Moreover, it is hard to justify a cause of action that demands stricter 
proof in a negotiated transaction than in an open market transaction. It is 
particularly hard to justify such a result when part of the rationale for bonow- 
ing the requirements from common law is to limit liability under the rule. 
Less radically, fraud on the market is analyzed, not as eliminating the 
element of reliance, but as according plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption of 
236. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1W5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 91 1 (1977), is the leading 
case requiring that a plaintiff in a rule lob-5 claim establish that he used "due diligence" in mak- 
ing his investment decision. Under Dupuy, plaintiffs negligence will not bar his recovery; only 
reckless conduct establishes lack of due diligence. Other courts require that plaintiff demonstrate 
"reasonable" reliance. See, e.8, Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 955 (1977). 
237. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text. 
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reliance. A fraud on the market theory dispensing with a requirement that 
investors must actually read the disclosure documents is sound in the case of 
widely-traded securities. Affording plaintiff a presumption of reliance in the 
case of widely-traded securities follows logically from the efficient-market the- 
ory, and it is appropriate to transfer to the defendant the burden of disproving 
reliance. Such a relaxed view of reliance, however, is not appropriate in cases 
of less widely-traded securities, in which the information regarding the stock is 
not so readily available. Here plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate 
some form of reliance. In most cases, it should not be necessary to demon- 
strate that the plaintiff actually read the document; reliance can take whatever 
form is reasonable under the circumstances. When the securities at issue are 
speculative, however, it is appropriate for the court to require plaintiff to prove 
actual reliance on the disclosure documents. 
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